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Preface  
In March 2011 China was forced to hastily evacuate more than 35 000 of its citi-
zens, many of them oil or construction workers, from Libya, as the regime of 
Muammar Gaddaﬁ collapsed. This incident illustrated the severe and growing 
threats to both Chinese interests and citizens in crisis zones around the globe. 
The global expansion of China’s interests thus raises serious questions about the 
sustainability of one of China’s key traditional foreign policy guidelines: the non-
interference principle. 
The sustainability of China’s commitment to non-interference is a key question 
for the future architecture of international security. In the post-cold war era, the 
policy debate within and outside China has focused on humanitarian intervention 
and the conditions of greater Chinese involvement in collective security and 
multilateral military operations. Although this debate has not yet come to an end, 
as a result of the rise of the country to great power status, the key question is 
increasingly becoming how China will use political inﬂuence and military power 
in support of its national interests overseas.  
The authors of this Policy Paper—experts from SIPRI’s China and Global 
Security Project—have used their unique access to Chinese official, commercial 
and academic circles to survey and analyse the current state of China’s debate on 
non-interference. They show that the protection of Chinese nationals and eco-
nomic assets overseas is widely perceived as a responsibility of the state, which 
stretches the boundaries of the non-interference principle. The evacuation from 
Libya was highly visible internationally, but Chinese government agencies and 
state-owned enterprises have taken many other steps to protect their interests 
overseas. These incremental policy adaptations have been tested by conﬂicts in 
regions where China has substantial energy interests. At the same time, inﬂuen-
tial academics are starting to challenge the mainstream view that non-
interference serves Chinese interests best.  
This research project has been made possible through a generous grant from 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SIPRI is tremendously grateful for 
this continued support. I would also like to express my personal gratitude to the 
three authors for this highly valuable contribution to the literature on China’s 
foreign and security policy.  
Dr Ian Anthony 
Director, SIPRI 
Stockholm, June 2014 
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Summary 
Chinese foreign policy is slowly shifting away from a strict interpretation of non-
interference, towards a pragmatic and incremental adaptation to new challenges 
to China’s globalizing economic and security interests. Although there has always 
been a degree of ﬂexibility in Chinese foreign policy regarding non-interference, 
even during the Maoist period, the principle has by and large remained a key 
guideline for diplomatic work and a major rhetorical tool.  
While non-interference continues to receive strong rhetorical support from 
China and is believed to be of great signiﬁcance with respect to the protection of 
China’s ‘core interests’, particularly on issues related to state sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and the socialist political system, a policy debate has emerged 
regarding the principle’s sustainability in recent years. Indeed, non-interference 
was crafted in a different international environment in which China had few 
economic and security interests to defend beyond its borders. As a result of the 
globalization of the Chinese economic and human presence, the extent to which 
non-interference is serving the national interest of China is increasingly being 
questioned. 
The rapid expansion of China’s overseas interests has led to an important 
policy debate in the Chinese strategic community. Many Chinese scholars expect 
that the globalization of China’s interests will result in transformations in China’s 
national defence policy and highlight in particular the importance of naval power. 
At the same time, normative transformations in the international system in the 
post-cold war era that have contributed to the erosion of sovereignty, such as the 
greater emphasis on human security, have also affected Chinese strategic debates 
regarding non-interference.  
However, the mainstream Chinese academic community still maintains that the 
beneﬁts of further adherence to non-interference outweigh the potential costs of 
a major policy change. China has engaged in a policy of pragmatic adaptation and 
has shown growing ﬂexibility in its application of non-interference. The emer-
gence of a number of new concepts, including ‘creative involvement’ and ‘con-
structive involvement’, facilitates this gradual change and equips China with 
more leeway to pursue an increasingly engaged foreign policy posture. Neverthe-
less, while Chinese overseas energy interests continue to grow rapidly, Chinese 
companies often operate in politically unstable countries and face increasing 
political and security risks, including armed conﬂict, political instability, terror-
ism, corruption, organized crime and piracy. 
China’s non-interference policy, combined with a lack of experience and 
overseas power-projection capabilities, has imposed serious limits on Chinese 
attempts to protect its growing overseas energy interests. In order to overcome 
this handicap, China has diversiﬁed its diplomatic outreach and has attempted to 
mediate between conﬂict parties—as clearly demonstrated in China’s evolving 
approach to the conﬂicts between and within Sudan and South Sudan—although 
so far with limited success. At the same time, China has also strengthened the risk 
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assessment, crisis response, corporate social responsibility and political insur-
ance capacities of its national oil companies. These adaptations aim to optimize 
the protection of Chinese energy interests in politically unstable or crisis areas, 
while maintaining the credibility of China’s official non-interference policy. 
Therefore, more radical approaches, especially the use of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) to protect energy assets abroad, seem unfeasible in the short-to-
medium term.  
Over the past decade the protection of nationals abroad has also emerged as a 
diplomatic priority for China. The number of Chinese individuals travelling or 
residing overseas has grown so rapidly that Chinese Government agencies lack 
accurate statistics in many countries. The boom in overseas travel and work by 
Chinese also means that Chinese citizens are more susceptible to risks and 
attacks abroad, and the globalization of Chinese ﬁrms and their investments in 
unstable countries and regions means that their employees face increasing safety 
risks. 
Protecting increasingly large numbers of nationals overseas could potentially 
shift Chinese foreign policy away from non-interference but, so far, China has 
preferred institutional adaption and capacity building. While Chinese Govern-
ment agencies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have integrated the issue as a 
priority, there is still room for improvements in crisis prevention and manage-
ment. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sought to reinforce preventive 
measures, institutionalize its internal consular protection system and establish 
inter-agency coordination mechanisms to provide better service for Chinese 
citizens overseas. Additionally, in major emergencies, China has gradually 
accumulated experience in conducting non-combatant evacuation operations. 
However, the sustainability of this approach is likely to be called into question by 
the growing involvement of armed actors, including the PLA, the Ministry of 
Public Security (MPS) and potentially private security companies, in the pro-
tection of nationals abroad. 
There is still a degree of uncertainty regarding whether China will continue on 
the path of pragmatic adaptation within the non-interference framework, and the 
degree of change on concrete policy outcomes that such an evolution would 
entail. The possibility of a dramatic policy change cannot be entirely discarded, as 
unforeseen events could precipitate change. China’s foreign policy could also 
strictly remain within the boundaries of non-interference. Its ultimate strategic 
choice will certainly have far-reaching effects on global governance and inter-
national security. For states seeking greater international security cooperation 
with China, this ongoing transformation creates new challenges and opportun-
ities.  
Abbreviations 
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CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
CDB China Development Bank 
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1. Introduction  
Non-interference is a cornerstone of China’s foreign policy. Since its inception by 
Zhou Enlai, Chinese Prime Minister, in 1953 as part of the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, the notion of non-interference has been closely associated 
with China’s self-image in world politics as a country that had regained 
sovereignty and independence after a century of foreign aggressions and that 
intended to conduct foreign relations on a basis ‘transcending social systems and 
ideologies’.1 It was as much about defending China from foreign interference in 
the context of the cold war as about ideological projection in the developing 
world. The adoption of the Five Principles in 1955 at the Bandung Conference of 
African and Asian states secured diplomatic space for China outside the 
communist bloc and among non-aligned developing countries.2 Non-interference 
was enshrined in the preamble of the 1982 Chinese Constitution and survived the 
end of the cold war.3 It continues to embody China’s vision of a multipolar world 
of independent sovereign states that conduct their domestic and foreign policies 
free from intervention from great powers.  
There is some degree of ambiguity in China’s ‘non-interference principle’ (
, bu ganshe yuanze). It focuses on ‘interference’ (, ganshe) but in 
certain cases seems to also cover ‘intervention’ (, ganyu). Indeed, the two 
terms are often used interchangeably in foreign policy publications and dis-
cussions, even if ganshe has more clear imperialist and hegemonic connotations 
and has a stronger focus on interference in domestic affairs, while ganyu can in 
certain cases also pertain to diplomatic involvement in regional conﬂicts.  
This ambiguity is aided by the absence of a precise deﬁnition in Chinese policy 
statements and international relations literature of which of a government’s 
actions might constitute interference in a state’s domestic affairs. China has long 
sought to engage diplomatically only with governments and to provide no 
support for opposition groups, so as to not affect the domestic balance of political 
power, even if this general rule was not respected in the 1950s and 1960s, when 
China supported revolutionary movements in Africa, South America and South 
East Asia.4 Today the rule applies to all forms of political support, including 
through arms sales.5 China only supports military intervention in another country 
 
1 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), ‘China’s initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence’, 17 Nov. 2000, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm>.  
2 Chen, J., ‘China and the Bandung conference, changing perceptions and representations’, eds T. See Seng 
and A. Acharya, Bandung Revisited, the Legacy of the 1955 Asian–African Conference for International Order 
(National University of Singapore Press: Singapore, 2008), pp. 132–59.  
3 The 5 principles are ‘mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, 
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual beneﬁt, and peaceful coexistence in 
developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries’. Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China, adopted 4 Dec. 1982, <http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/ 
constitution.html>, Preamble. 
4 Baranabov, M., Kashin, V. and Makienko, K., Shooting Star, China’s Military Machine in the 21st Century 
(East View Press: Minneapolis, 2012), section 3.1.  
5 Bromley, M., Duchâtel, M. and Holtom, P., China’s Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons, SIPRI 
Policy Paper no. 38 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Oct. 2013). 
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when sanctioned by a United Nations mandate and at the invitation of the coun-
try in question.  
Apart from these obvious red lines on arms sales, political support and military 
action, the boundary between interference and legitimate diplomatic practice has 
never been clearly deﬁned. This ambiguity creates space for diplomatic ﬂexibility. 
It also explains why, as recently as March 2014, some commentators criticized 
China’s double standards on non-interference when it did not oppose Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea.6 China has also been criticized for deploying its diplomatic 
resources to suppress support for Chinese dissident and pro-independence 
movements that are active in countries where freedom of speech is guaranteed by 
constitutional law.7  
Non-interference serves another key Chinese foreign policy goal. In addition to 
being a defensive weapon to protect Chinese sovereignty, by differentiating China 
from the West it helps supports the global economic expansion of China in 
developing countries. This has become especially apparent with the exponential 
growth in the overseas activities of Chinese ﬁrms since the beginning of the  
21st century. China’s ‘no strings attached’ approach to foreign aid, trade and 
investment exchanges has been widely criticized in the West, but non-inter-
ference is also a soft-power tool. China is part of a large coalition of like-minded 
governments that use a strict adherence to non-interference as a defensive tool 
against intrusive Western liberal values and the risks of regime change.  
However, the extent to which non-interference is serving the national interest 
of China is increasingly being questioned. This is arguably due to the fact that 
China’s national interest is also changing. In 2014 China became the world’s 
largest trading power, and in 2012 it ranked third in terms of outbound direct 
investments.8 China’s presence overseas is also a human one. According to the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the number of Chinese nationals 
travelling abroad each year will reach 100 million in 2015. Non-interference was 
crafted in a different international environment in which China had few eco-
nomic and security interests to defend beyond its borders.  
This Policy Paper explores the extent to which a change in China’s non-inter-
ference policy has been and can be further driven by the globalization of Chinese 
interests. It focuses on three possible drivers of change: policy and academic 
ideas, energy interests, and the protection of nationals overseas. In the past 
decade, there have been signs that the seeds of change had been planted. Clearly, 
in contrast to the debate in the 1990s on China’s international responsibilities 
regarding humanitarian intervention and responding to Western pressures, the 
expansion of China’s ‘overseas interests’ (, haiwai liyi) is putting non-
interference under greater strain. A major turning point occurred in 2004 when 
President Hu Jintao ﬁrst mentioned the notion in a public speech. Hu urged 
 
6 ‘Non-interference on the line’, The Economist, Banyan Blog, 15 Mar. 2014, <http://www.economist. 
com/news/china/21599035-crisis-ukraine-uncovers-hole-heart-chinese-foreign-policy-non-interference>.  
7 ‘Oregon town angers China with mural on Taiwan, Tibet’, Reuters, 10 Sep. 2012.  
8 ‘China overtakes US as world’s largest good trader’, Financial Times, 10 Jan. 2014; and ‘China overseas 
direct investment to exceed FDI by 2017 says study’, South China Morning Post, 29 Apr. 2013.  
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China’s diplomatic work to ‘enhance the capability of protecting interests 
overseas, improve relevant laws and regulations, strengthen the early-warning 
and fast-response system, improve the style of work and enthusiastically serve 
Chinese citizens and legal persons in foreign countries’.9  
All signs since the leadership transition in 2012 suggest that the defence of 
‘overseas interests’ is gaining strong momentum in China. President Hu’s ﬁnal 
report to the 18th Party Congress as General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) mentioned, for the ﬁrst time, the protection of nationals overseas as 
a new foreign policy priority.10 The 2013 Chinese Defence White Paper went fur-
ther, declaring for the ﬁrst time that the protection of overseas energy resources 
and Chinese nationals overseas is a major security concern and a task for the 
Chinese military. 
With the gradual integration of China’s economy into the world economic system, 
overseas interests have become an integral component of China’s national interests. 
Security issues are increasingly prominent, involving overseas energy and resources, stra-
tegic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and Chinese nationals and legal persons 
oveseas. Vessel protection at sea, evacuation of Chinese nationals overseas, and emergency 
rescue have become important ways and means for the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] to 
safeguard national interests and fulﬁl China’s international obligations.11  
Protecting the ‘legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals residing 
abroad’ also has a basis in the Constitution.12 
Hesitations in Chinese foreign policy with regard to non-interference have 
become particularly evident in China’s relations with Myanmar. In February 2013 
the director of the anti-narcotics bureau of the Chinese Ministry of Public Secur-
ity (MPS), Liu Yuejin, revealed in a media interview that his unit had considered 
conducting a drone strike in Myanmar.13 If successful, the plan—which was 
motivated by the murder of 13 Chinese sailors in Thailand in October 2011 by a 
group of South East Asian criminals led by a Myanmar national—would have 
resulted in the ﬁrst targeted overseas assassination by a Chinese drone.14 The 
revelation that individuals within China’s foreign policy and law enforcement 
apparatus now consider targeted assassination abroad as a policy option is an un-
precedented development. At the same time, as one Chinese risk analyst has 
observed, ‘Myanmar is the best example of China’s commitment to non-inter-
 
9 Permanent mission of China to the UN at Geneva, ‘The 10th Conference of Chinese diplomatic envoys 
stationed abroad held in Beijing’, <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/xwdt/t156047.htm>. See also Men, H. and 
Zhong. F., ‘	, ’ [The history, current situation and prospect of the study 
on China’s overseas interests], waijiao pinglun, no. 5 (2009), pp. 56–71.  
10 ‘Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress’, Xinhua, 18 Nov. 2012. 
11 Chinese State Council, The Diversiﬁed Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Defence White Paper 
(Information Office of the State Council: Beijing, Apr. 2013), chapter 3. 
12 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (note 3), Article 50.  
13 ‘"#
 !$’ [Head of the investigation team reveals process of 
apprehending Naw Kha: we considered a drone decapitation strike], Global Times, 18 Feb. 2013, <http:// 
china.huanqiu.com/local/2013-02/3651930.html>.  
14 ‘Mekong river murderers executed by lethal injection’, Xinhua, 1 Mar. 2013.  
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ference. We have lost ground as a result of recent political developments in the 
country. We could have chosen to interfere, but we decided against it.’15 
This Policy Paper is the ﬁrst study to analyse comprehensively the ongoing 
change in China’s approach and practice of non-interference in relation to the 
globalization of its economic interests. It emphasizes Chinese perspectives, 
drawing on open-source analyses in Chinese and English, and on interviews with 
Chinese experts.16 Chapter 2 reviews recent academic and policy debates in 
China on the sustainability of non-interference in the context of the global expan-
sion of Chinese interests overseas. Chapter 3 addresses the case of energy 
interests overseas, which epitomize the global growth of Chinese interests in 
areas of the world affected by political and security risks. Chapter 4 outlines the 
protection of Chinese nationals overseas, detailing attacks, threat perception, risk 
assessment and Chinese foreign policy adaptations. Chapter 5 presents con-
clusions.  
 
15 Risk analyst, Chinese policy bank, Interview with authors, Beijing, Jan. 2013 (author’s translation).  
16 The authors conducted research interviews with Chinese officials and experts in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Urumqi from late 2012 to early 2014 on Chinese energy interests and the protection of Chinese nationals 
overseas, and with Central Asian China specialists and energy analysts in Astana, Almaty and Bishkek in Oct. 
2012 to gauge local views on Chinese interests in the region and the 2010 evacuation of Chinese citizens 
from Kyrgyzstan. In order to respect conﬁdentiality, interviews cited here remain anonymous.  
2. Chinese debates on non-interference 
Although China has always been consistent in its rhetorical support for non-
interference, in recent years a policy debate has emerged regarding the prin-
ciple’s sustainability. Furthermore, normative developments in the international 
system continue to challenge the traditional primacy of state sovereignty. Mean-
while, China’s embrace of economic globalization entails protecting its expanding 
webs of overseas interests, which often calls for a more engaging and proactive 
foreign policy than the strict form of non-interference would normally allow. The 
evacuation operation during the Libyan crisis in 2011 (see chapter 4) is a case in 
point, illustrating that measures to safeguard overseas interests require 
substantial diplomatic manoeuvres, and sometimes intensive cooperation from 
other states in affairs that China has traditionally perceived as strictly internal.  
Efforts by the Chinese foreign policy community to adapt non-interference to 
meet new challenges conﬁrm that China’s steadfast commitment has ceded 
ground to interest-driven pragmatism. The mainstream discourse appears to dis-
agree with abandoning this longstanding principle, but tries to rely on a less 
dogmatic interpretation of non-interference and explores ﬂexibility in imple-
menting concrete foreign policy. This approach is probably epitomized by China’s 
special envoy to the Middle East, Wu Sike, in his comment that ‘non-interference 
in each other’s internal affairs does not mean doing nothing’.17 A move towards a 
more active foreign policy posture is also reflected in the fact that since Xi 
Jinping assumed supreme power, as president and CPC general secretary, in late 
2012 he has not publicly reaffirmed Deng Xiaoping’s much-repeated adage of 
‘keeping a low profile’ (, taoguang yanghui).  
China’s strict adherence to non-interference  
In 2012 President Hu re-affirmed China’s adherence to non-interference in his 
ﬁnal report to the 18th Party Congress, stating that ‘China opposes hegemonism 
and power politics in all their forms, does not interfere in other countries’ 
internal affairs and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion’.18 This was 
in line with Hu’s report to the 17th Congress ﬁve years earlier, in which he stated 
that ‘hegemonism and power politics still exist’.19 However, Hu’s 2012 report 
demonstrated increased prudence against intervention and placed a stronger 
emphasis on non-interference, characterizing the international environment as 
showing increasing signs of ‘neo-interventionism’ (
, xinganshe 
zhuyi).20 Hu also claimed for the ﬁrst time that, in order to meet these challenges, 
 
17 Wu, S., ‘
	’ [Non-interference does not mean doing nothing], Renmin Ribao,  
31 May 2011, <http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2011-05/31/nbs.D110000renmrb_03.htm> (author’s 
translation). 
18 ‘Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress’ (note 10). 
19 ‘Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 17th Party Congress’, Xinhua, 24 Oct. 2007. 
20 Swaine, M. D., ‘The 18th Party Congress and foreign policy: the dog that did not bark?’, China Leader-
ship Monitor, no. 40 (2013), p. 2.  
6   PROTECTING CHINA’S OVERSEAS INTERESTS 
China would ‘oppose any foreign attempt to subvert the legitimate government of 
any other countries’.21 These new references, probably based on China’s re-
ﬂection on the current situation in Libya and Syria, hint at growing anxiety over 
foreign intervention. 
The beginning of the new millennium had witnessed the introduction of a new 
slogan coined by Hu to guide China’s diplomacy: ‘harmonious world’ (	, 
hexie shijie). While ‘harmonious world’ is believed to indicate a new level of 
diplomatic activism in China’s approach to regional and international affairs, 
there is also a remarkable continuity between this concept and the Five Prin-
ciples.22 In an April 2006 speech to Saudi Arabia’s Consultative Council, Hu 
argued that, in order to build a harmonious world, all countries need to abide by 
the principle of non-interference and avoid using ‘differences [in cultural 
traditions, political and social systems, values and development] as a pretext to 
point a ﬁnger at other countries’ internal affairs’. 23 In March 2007 the Chinese 
Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, stated that ‘mutual respect and non-interference 
in each other’s internal affairs between countries are the necessary conditions for 
building a harmonious world’.24 Thus, despite its references to multilateralism, 
the concept of the ‘harmonious world’ alludes to a world composed of sovereign 
states in which non-interference holds continued prominence. Another phrase 
that has been repeatedly emphasized by Chinese leaders since the 2000s, ‘dem-
ocratization of international relations’ (
, guoji guanxi minzhu-
hua), also reﬂects this thinking. This concept stresses the equality and sover-
eignty of all countries in the international community and therefore enables 
smaller and developing countries to guard against interventionism, power politics 
and hegemonism.25  
Chinese foreign policy elites’ rhetorical support for non-interference is also 
evident under the new leadership. Wang Yi, in his ﬁrst public speech as Foreign 
Minister in June 2013, maintained that China must ‘oppose the big, the strong 
and the rich bullying the small, the weak and the poor, and oppose interference in 
other countries’ internal affairs’.26 Likewise, in January 2013 the new Chinese 
President, Xi Jinping, reiterated China’s unswerving adherence to the Five Prin-
ciples during the Politburo ‘collective study sessions’ on the path of peaceful 
 
21 ‘Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress’ (note 10). 
22 Gao, S. and Blanchard, J., Harmonious World and China’s New Foreign Policy (Lexington Books: Ply-
mouth, 2008), pp. 6–10. 
23 ‘Chinese president on world harmony, Middle East’, Xinhua, 23 Apr. 2006. 
24 ‘Chinese FM: Non-interference necessary condition for harmonious world’, Xinhua, 6 Mar. 2007. 
25 Ren, J., ‘

’ [The theory and practice of China’s 
promotion to the democratization of international relations since the new century], Dangdai Zhongguoshi 
Yanjiu, vol. 18, no. 6 (Nov. 2011) (author’s translation). See also Scott, D., ‘Soft languages, soft imagery and soft 
power in China’s diplomatic lexicon’, eds H. Lai and Y. Lu, China’s Soft Power and International Relations 
(Routledge: Oxon, 2012), pp. 39–63. 
26 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Exploring the path of major-country diplomacy with Chinese 
characteristics: remarks by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the luncheon of the second World Peace Forum’, 
Press Release, 27 Jun. 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/ 
t1053908.shtml>. 
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development.27 Xi’s new catchphrase, ‘new type of great-power relations’ (&
2, xinxing daguo guanxi), primarily operationalizes calls for China and the 
United States to ‘have respect for each other’, which also connotes the continued 
relevance of non-interference in China’s foreign policy mindset. As Yang Jiechi, 
Chinese State Councillor in charge of foreign affairs elaborated, the phrase ‘have 
respect for each other’ meant that the two countries should ‘respect each other’s 
social system and development road, respect each other’s core interests and 
signiﬁcant concern’.28 
Rationales behind China’s strict adherence to non-interference  
Many Chinese intellectuals share the view that the principle of non-interference 
serves Chinese foreign policy interests best. This perspective has much to do 
with the identiﬁcation of China as a developing and postcolonial country. In their 
eyes, despite China’s gradual integration into the international community and its 
growing national strength, Western countries will not abandon the idea of 
obstructing the rise of China. Therefore, non-interference is signiﬁcant with 
respect to the protection of China’s ‘core interests’ ()$., hexin liyi), particu-
larly on issues related to state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the socialist 
political system.29 As China’s former Ambassador to Egypt, An Huihou, argues, to 
jettison this principle would ‘be inviting trouble and undermine [China’s] own 
sovereignty and core interests’.30 Similarly, Ren Weidong, a researcher at the 
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), argues that 
there are two fundamental contradictions that are closely related to China’s 
survival, ‘between independence and hegemony, and between socialism and 
capitalism’. The principle of non-interference can therefore still serve as a 
‘political weapon’ to prevent any foreign meddling in China’s domestic affairs and 
as a ‘political guarantee against the submersion of socialist countries in the sea of 
capitalism’. 31  
The outcome of the international intervention in Libya in 2011 heightened 
these scholars’ suspicions. The intervention itself has been interpreted as evi-
 
27 ‘9"
%+0*>	'#4(31<5" :6-
/’ [Xi Jinping emphasized in the third Politburo collective study session: better overall planning of 
domestic and international situations, solidly taking the path of peaceful development], Renmin Ribao,  
30 Jan. 2013, <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0130/c1001-20367778.html>. 
28 Chinese MFA, ‘Yang Jiechi’s remarks on the results of the Presidential meeting between Xi Jinping and 
Obama at the Annenberg Estate’, Press release, 9 Jun. 2013, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgxss/ 
t1049301.htm>. 
29 An, H., ‘The principle of non-interference versus neo-interventionism’, Foreign Affairs Journal, no. 104 
(summer 2012); and Liu, W., ‘!,%78’ [The principle of non-interference should not be 
trampled on], Guangming Ribao, 22 May 2012, <http://gmw.cn/gjgc/2012-05/31/content_4255014.htm>. 
China’s 2011 white paper on peaceful development deﬁnes China’s core interests as ‘state sovereignty, 
national security, territorial integrity and national reuniﬁcation, China’s political system established by the 
Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and 
social development’. Chinese State Council, China’s Peaceful Development, White Paper (Information Office 
of the State Council: Beijing, 6 Sep. 2011). 
30 An (note 29). 
31 Ren, W., ‘$!,%=;’ [Be careful of the trap of interfering in other states’ internal 
affairs], People’s Daily (overseas edn), 14 Jun. 2013, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-06/14/c_116 
138125.htm> (author’s translation). 
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dence that Western neo-interventionism is on the rise and that certain countries 
are keen to intervene to cause regime changes under the cover of the responsi-
bility to protect (R2P) or ‘humanitarianism’.32 Hence, scholars assert that China 
should be vigilant against attempts by the West to soften China’s position on non-
interference, such as attacking China’s policy on the grounds of it being ‘in-
humane’, or stepping up rhetoric pressing China to assume more ‘responsi-
bility’.33  
Additionally, China’s Vice Foreign Minister once stated that ‘the non-inter-
ference principle is not out-dated and it constitutes, especially for developing 
countries, an important guarantee to defend their rights’.34 Many scholars argue 
that China’s adherence to non-interference helps it maintain political affinity 
with other developing countries.35 Hence, China should continue to side with 
them to uphold this principle, especially given the current international system, 
which remains unjust and unfavourable.36 Other concerns over forsaking non-
interference include possible damage to the credibility of China’s commitment to 
‘peaceful development’ and ‘not seeking hegemony’, and unnecessary inter-
national responsibilities beyond China’s capabilities.37 
Normative developments in the international system 
China’s long-standing commitment to non-interference does not mean that the 
foreign policy community within China has always reached consensus on its 
validity and relevance. As Yan Xuetong, Director of the Institute of International 
Relations at Tsinghua University, wrote in 2011, ‘a few years ago, almost no 
Chinese scholar challenged the principle of nonintervention, of infringing on the 
sovereignty of other nations. Recently there are more and more debates on this 
issue.’38 One of the important factors contributing to current domestic critiques of 
China’s strict adherence to non-interference is normative developments in the 
international system.  
China’s staunch insistence on non-interference is intimately associated with its 
normative understanding of sovereignty, which at least partly originates from its 
historical memory of being semi-colonized. However, signiﬁcant normative 
 
32 An (note 29); Lin, B., ‘0$#(
%*’ [The western neo-interventionism is hazardous], 
CRI Online, 31 Feb. 2012, <http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2012/02/21/5951s3566144.htm>; Wang, Y., ‘	)
 ()’ [The changes and consistencies of China’s diplomacy (part 1)], Jiefang Ribao, 29 Oct. 2012, 
<http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2012-10/29/content_908567.htm>; and Wu, X., ‘7 .
	!’ [With the turbulence of the international situation, China’s diplomacy 
should insist on the ‘three NOs’ principles], Dangdai Shijie, no. 4 (2012), pp. 52–53. 
33 Wu (note 32); and Zheng, X., ‘('4&’ [The principle of non-interference is not out-
dated], Dongfang Zaobao, 29 Mar. 2011, <http://www.dfdaily.com/html/51/2011/3/29/586020.shtml>. 
34 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘556,8+/2)13’ [Vice Foreign 
Minister Zhai Jun’s speech at the seventh Blue Room Forum], 12 July 2012, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ 
cggb/chn/xwdt/t950390.htm>. 
35 Su, C., ‘(-"’ [China’s adherence to non-interference cannot be shaken], Jiefang 
Ribao, 25 Apr. 2011, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/observation/2011-04/25/c_121344390.htm>. 
36 Liu (note 29). 
37 Su (note 35); and Zheng (note 33). 
38 Yan, X., ‘How assertive should a great power be?’, The New York Times, 31 Mar. 2011. 
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transformations in the international system have contributed to the erosion of 
sovereignty. The challenges that sovereignty faces include the erosion of state 
jurisdiction over internal affairs, the evolving interpretation of ‘international 
peace and security’ with a stronger emphasis on human rights, the emergence of 
R2P interpreting state sovereignty as responsibility, and the increasing import-
ance given to democratic values and the rule of law.39 In addition, as early as the 
mid-1990s Chinese scholars started reﬂecting on the increasing limitations on the 
exercise of sovereignty in international politics as a result of globalization.40 
In parallel to normative developments at the international level, Chinese 
international relations experts also point out that several non-Western regional 
organizations, mainly composed of developing countries, have gradually softened 
their rigid understanding of sovereignty and intervention. For instance, the Afri-
can Union (AU) put forward a ‘non-indifference doctrine’, and the Community of 
Latin American and Caribbean States asserts that member states should 
intervene in case of a coup d’état.41 The League of Arab States also called for 
international intervention in both Libya and Syria.42 Some Chinese researchers 
suggest that China should take into consideration these new developments 
within the bloc of developing countries, which used to adhere to non-inter-
ference as staunchly as China. Noting these developments, Yan Xuetong states 
that, in the coming decade, the international norms of intervention and non-
interference will be likely to co-exist.43  
Partly due to these normative developments, China’s ties with some countries 
on the basis of non-interference are also under growing criticism. For instance, 
China has long been criticized for turning a blind eye to human rights abuses in 
Zimbabwe while developing booming economic and trade relations with that 
country. The pressure on China to act as a responsible power and leverage with 
these regimes peaked in 2008—the year in which China hosted the Olympic 
Games—when the ‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign targeted Chinese policy on the 
Darfur issue. In recent years, Chinese scholars have noticed that their inter-
locutors from developing countries, in particular the media and public 
intellectuals, have also called for Chinese intervention.44 They have also noticed a 
 
39 Yang, Z., ‘"F?>6!870,&H&92G
>1/(%’ [Democracy 
and rule by law in international societies and protective intervention—the challenges non-interference faces 
and China’s response], Falv Kexue (Xibei zhengfa daxue xuebao), no. 5 (2012), pp. 41–47. 
40 Carlson, A., ‘Moving beyond sovereignty? A brief consideration of recent changes in China’s approach 
to international order and the emergence of the tianxia concept’, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 20,  
no. 68 (Jan. 2011), pp. 81–102. 
41 Guo, P., ‘E274+@’ [On the principle of not attaching any political conditions], 
Ershiyi Shiji Wangluoban, vol. 66, no. 9 (2007), <http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/supplem/essay/0706060g. 
htm>; Yan, X., ‘C#*)$ C#*:’ [From the global order of ‘one superpower, many 
great powers’ to a bipolar one], Huanqiu Shibao, 30 Nov. 2011, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-12/ 
30/c_122512319.htm>; and Yan, X., >-,35'>	"= [Inertia of history: China and the 
world in the next ten years] (China CITIC Press: Beijing, 2013), pp. 80–84.  
42 Yan [Inertia of History] (note 41). 
43 Yan [Inertia of History] (note 41). 
44 Chinese international relations academic, Interview with authors, Beijing, Nov. 2013; and Wang, Y., 
D,	";BA><. [Creative involvement: the evolution of China’s global role] (Peking 
University Press: Beijing, 2013). 
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growing discrepancy between elites and local populations regarding China’s 
position on non-interference.45  
The evolution of China’s attitude to the responsibility to protect 
China’s changing position on R2P epitomizes both the erosive impact and the 
limits thereof that normative developments in the international system exert on 
China’s adherence to non-interference.46 China has gradually developed a pru-
dent case-by-case approach to R2P (and international intervention more gener-
ally) and seeks to condition its support for intervention on maintaining the non-
interference principle. In particular, China insists on (a) the consent of the target 
state; (b) support from regional organizations; (c) prioritization of peaceful over 
military means; and (d) UN authorization.47  
China was among the UN member states that embraced R2P in the 2005 World 
Summit and did not play a spoiling role.48 In fact, China actively participated in 
the deliberations leading to the Summit’s outcome document, which conﬁned the 
scope of application of R2P to four serious crimes and, more importantly, 
reaffirmed that the UN Security Council had the exclusive determining right for 
the use of force.49 This modiﬁcation ensures that China, a permanent member of 
the Security Council, can veto any R2P-based resolution and largely explains 
China’s endorsement of R2P in the outcome document.50 In 2006 China also 
supported UN Security Council Resolution 1674 (on Somalia) which re-affirmed 
R2P in the context of the protection of civilians in armed conﬂict against the four 
serious crimes.51 China insisted that R2P should conform to the World Summit 
document, but its support for the resolution suggested that when intervention is 
called for in a failed state without any legitimate or functioning government, 
China could accept UN-sponsored solutions.52 
The crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan was the ﬁrst important test of China’s 
position on R2P. In the name of R2P, Western states criticized the Sudanese 
 
45  Wang (note 44); and Jiang, L. and Wang, H., ‘*/!4"'$% 
	0#!2+&3,.’ [An analysis on the variance of attached political condition in the 
current foreign aid—based on the comparative study on the practice of foreign aid of China and Western 
countries] Taipingyang Xuebao, vol. 19, no. 7 (July 2011), pp. 53–62.  
46 On R2P see International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsi-
bility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (International 
Development Research Centre: Ottawa, 2001). 
47 Foot, R., ‘China, humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’, Paper presented at 
China’s Foreign Policy and its Non-interference Principle: Farewell or Renewal?, Asia Centre, Paris, 8 June 
2012, <http://www.centreasia.eu/sites/default/ﬁles/publications_pdf/papers_seminar_20120608_0.pdf>; and 
Liu, T., ‘China and responsibility to protect: maintenance and change of its policy for intervention’, Paciﬁc 
Review, vol. 25, no. 1 (Mar. 2012), pp. 153–73. 
48 Evans, G., ‘Responding to atrocities: the new geopolitics of intervention’, SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Arma-
ments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012), p. 30.  
49 Foot (note 47); Li, B., ‘ +1)+’ [The inﬂuence of the ICISS report 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ on ‘the principle of non-interference’], Falv Kexue (Xibei Zhengfa Daxue Xuebao), 
no. 3 (2007), pp. 131–39; Li, S., ‘ +1*
5(-’ [‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the 
international legal order], Zhengfa Luntan, vol. 24, no. 3 (May 2006), pp. 99–107; and Liu (note 47). 
50 Garwood-Gowers, A., ‘China and the “Responsibility to Protect”: the implications of the Libyan 
intervention’, Asian Journal of International Law, vol. 2, no. 2 (Jul. 2012), pp. 375–93. 
51 Foot (note 47). 
52 The authors are grateful to the referee for highlighting this point. 
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Government for not fulﬁlling its responsibility to protect citizens, and China for 
its strict adherence to non-interference. China’s initially inactive policy only 
started to shift when it suffered signiﬁcant image loss due to a worldwide 
organized campaign to boycott the 2008 Olympics, and in the end China played a 
key role in persuading Sudan to accept UN-led peace operations. Reputational 
considerations appear to have contributed to a more ﬂexible interpretation of 
sovereignty, which could enable a softening of China’s position on R2P.53 
In 2011 China supported UN Security Council Resolution 1970, which imposed 
an arms embargo on Libya and referred the situation to the International 
Criminal Court. One month later, China abstained on UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1973, which imposed a no-ﬂy zone over Libya.54 Both resolutions invoked 
the responsibility to protect civilians and were adopted without the consent of 
the Libyan Government. However, China’s voting behaviour might be attributed 
more to the particular circumstances of the situation in Libya, rather than to 
China’s increased receptiveness towards R2P.55 China’s representative to the UN, 
Li Baodong, explained China’s abstention by stating that China had ‘serious 
difficulty with parts of the resolution’, preferred resolving ‘the current crisis in 
Libya through peaceful means’ and attached ‘great importance to the position by 
the 22-member Arab League [and] to the position of African countries and the 
African Union’.56 The evolution of the intervention into a military campaign 
backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and targeting the 
regime of Muammar Gaddaﬁ was perceived by China as exceeding the mandate. 
In a Security Council meeting on the Libya situation Li stated that China opposed 
‘any arbitrary interpretation of the Council’s resolutions or of any actions going 
beyond those mandated by the Council’.57 The fallout from the Libya case has 
hardened China’s resistance to R2P and has also had crucial implications for 
Syria-related resolutions, with China so far having joined Russia to cast four 
vetoes against any direct and coercive action against the regime of Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad.58 
Academic debates on R2P largely reﬂect the evolution of China’s official 
position. The limited number of Chinese scholars who followed the release of the 
2001 R2P report by the Canada-sponsored International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) were antagonistic, mainly because of their 
memories of NATO bombings in Yugoslavia and military intervention in Kosovo.59 
They saw the report as being imbued with ‘Western old colonialism’ and as 
 
53 Garwood-Gowers (note 50); and Prantl, J., and Nakano, R., ‘Global norm diffusion in East Asia: how 
China and Japan implement the Responsibility to Protect’, International Relations, vol. 25, no. 2 (Mar. 2007), 
pp. 301–319. 
54 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, 17 Mar. 2011. 
55 Fullilove, M., ‘China and the United Nations: the stakeholder spectrum’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 34, 
no. 3 (summer 2011), pp. 71–72; and Garwood-Gowers (note 50).  
56 United Nations, Security Council, 6498th meeting, S/PV.6498, 17 Mar. 2011.  
57 United Nations, S/PV.6498 (note 56).  
58 ‘Russia, China veto UN move to refer Syria to ICC’, Associated Press, 22 May 2014. 
59 ICISS (note 46). 
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another attempt to justify future US-led Western interventions.60 When Koﬁ 
Annan, the UN Secretary-General, reported on UN reform in early 2005, 
criticism from Chinese experts asserted that Annan’s suggestion would facilitate 
Western countries’ external interference under the cover of humanitarian con-
siderations and help achieve their strategic goals at the expense of third world 
countries’ sovereignty.61 However, some opponents admitted that basic inter-
national consensus had been reached in the R2P debate that ‘sovereignty is 
limited and human rights protection affects international peace and security’.62 
Nevertheless, concerns that R2P could easily be manipulated by ‘hegemonic 
states’ to infringe on the sovereignty of other countries have yet to be overcome.  
Regarding China’s position on the Darfur crisis, Chinese scholars assert that 
China’s insistence on a political solution, mediation with Sudan and support for 
the roles of the UN and the AU were all in agreement with R2P.63 According to 
Yuan Wu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), ‘R2P provides more 
space for peaceful conﬂict resolution, puts limitations on military intervention, 
and is therefore relatively speaking in line with China’s interests and diplomatic 
strategy’.64 However, some Chinese realist intellectuals still strongly opposed 
R2P-guided humanitarian interventions and saw Western states’ reaction to the 
Darfur crisis as ‘a step forward to subvert the current international order’.65  
The result of the intervention in Libya marked the end of cautious receptive-
ness towards R2P within the Chinese academic community. Most Chinese 
scholars, while concurring with the applicability of R2P to the situation in Libya, 
strongly criticize NATO for abusing the resolution.66 According to them, R2P was 
misused in Libya to drive regime change and this sent a dangerous signal to 
opposition groups in other countries.67  R2P could raise opposition groups’ 
 
60 Chen, X., ‘6J*e6h*eHN%%’ [Interference vs. international intervention: changes 
and consistencies of international law], Faxue Jia, no. 5 (2002), pp. 59–62. 
61 Chen, X., ‘U'*>g 21R*eO7’ [UN reform and international order in the 21st century], 
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62 Luo, G., ‘b6JN*eHLZ#@$5’ [The international legal theory of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ and its new developments], Faxue, no. 11 (2006), pp. 86–91. 
63 He, W., ‘a313di	*fI?QN@Tk’ [The Darfur issue: a new test for China’s African 
policy], Guoji Zhanwang, no. 2 (2010), pp. 78–92; and Yuan, W., ‘\Z	*+fIcP,L	NM 
<N^]`’ [On China’s role in dealing with Africa’s internal conﬂicts—assessment of the theory of 
‘responsibility to protect’], Xiya Feizhou, no. 10 (2008), pp. 58–62. 
64 Yuan (note 63) (author’s translation). 
65 Zhang, R., ‘Y:WAb6h
(jXKV*eO7’ [On guard against the toppling of the 
current international order by the Western powers under the pretext of ‘humanitarian intervention’], 
Xiandai Guoji Gguanxi, no. 9 (2008). 
66 Certain Chinese scholars also argue that R2P is not applicable to the Libyan crisis. See e.g. Cheng, W.,  
‘2GMFN'H9C’ [Analysis of the legitimacy of the use of force against Libya], Ouzhou 
Yanqiu, no. 3 (2011), pp. 24–26. 
67 Liu, B. and Dai, W., ‘	%b6hN@$5’ [Drastic changes in Middle East and new 
development of humanitarian intervention], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, vol. 270, no. 4 (2012), pp. 38–45; Wang, L., 
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international intervention: Libya crisis as a case study], Guoji guancha, vol. 21, no. 6 (2012), pp. 64–77; Yang, 
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expectations of international intervention, leading them to resist compromising. 
Some opportunistic groups might even deliberately intensify situations or pro-
voke governments so that R2P can be invoked.68 Concerns have also been 
expressed over the lack of monitoring mechanisms and exit strategies once 
missions are undertaken under R2P.69 Whereas Western governments generally 
see the intervention in Libya as a successful practice of R2P, Chinese academics 
regard China’s abstention as a diplomatic mistake.70 Within Chinese academia, a 
new concept—‘responsible protection’ (56,!, fuzeren de baohu)—has 
been proposed to make civilian protection interventions more accountable and 
proportionate.71 It is highly likely that China will continue to shape the discursive 
environment to make R2P more compatible with its preferences.  
The expansion of China’s overseas interests  
Another factor that leads many Chinese experts to re-evaluate non-interference 
is the rapid expansion of China’s overseas interests. Hu’s report to the 18th Party 
Congress for the ﬁrst time stated that China would take solid steps to ‘protect 
China’s legitimate rights and interests overseas’.72  Apart from the security, 
property and legitimate rights of Chinese citizens and enterprises abroad, the 
scope of overseas interests is broadly deﬁned by Chinese scholars to cover the 
state’s political, economic and military interests abroad, for instance, energy 
security, the security of sea lines of communication, and its legitimate rights in 
‘high seas, polar regions and outer-space’ (;7+, gaobianjiang).73  
China’s increasing economic engagement with the outside world, including in 
some of the world’s most conﬂict-ridden regions, has resulted in China’s overseas 
interests straining its position on non-interference. While being committed not to 
interfere in other state’s internal affairs, China puts itself in a passive position 
when its interests are affected by changes in other states’ domestic politics. Pang 
Zhongying, Professor of International Relations at Renmin University, identiﬁes 
this as one of China’s major foreign policy dilemmas.74 Furthermore, he argues 
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that ‘China should declare clearly that China intervenes globally, regionally, and 
multilaterally, but conditionally’, and ‘a global China . . . has to intervene’.75  
Concerns are increasingly voiced over whether China’s strict adherence to non-
interference may hinder it from protecting the safety of its growing overseas 
investments and the large number of Chinese citizens abroad. It is likely that 
China may fail to protect its overseas interests if non-interference is often 
narrowly understood as ‘non-involvement’ or ‘not exerting inﬂuence’.76  Cui 
Hongjian, a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), 
argues that China needs to update its security concept, as well as the mechanisms 
and actions that are predicated on the principle of non-interference, because they 
are currently conﬁned to China’s territorial limits and cannot provide a sufficient 
security guarantee for China’s ever-growing interests abroad.77 As long as its 
economy continues to become more interdependent on the global market and 
trade, China’s overseas interests are only likely to be more exposed to global risks. 
This will probably continue to complicate China’s stance on non-interference.  
The discourse in favour of a ‘Mahanian’ navy  
The expansion of overseas interests has stimulated academic discussion on the 
role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in protecting these interests, with 
many scholars highlighting the particular importance of naval power.78 The pro-
ponents of Chinese ‘sea power’ (!, haiquan) often consider China’s growing 
overseas interests as one of the main motivations for a ‘Mahanian’ (i.e. blue-
water) navy able to protect China’s commercial interests worldwide.79  For 
instance, Zhang Wenmu, a researcher affiliated with Beihang University, notes 
that China is in urgent need of sea power to protect the security of Chinese 
citizens overseas and its interests in sea communications crucial to China’s 
energy access and foreign trade—on both of which China’s economy increasingly 
relies.80 In Zhang’s analysis, as a result of economic globalization China’s ‘security 
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borders’ extend globally to where its interests extend. Therefore, China’s navy, 
the PLA Navy (PLAN) should not only safeguard ‘border security’ but also go 
where China’s ‘security borders’ end. 81  Similarly, Professor Ni Lexiong at 
Shanghai University of Political Science and Law argues that, as China’s economy 
becomes increasingly dependent on maritime trade, so comes the call for ‘sea 
power’.82 He goes further to assert that, in order to meet challenges to the safety 
of China’s ‘maritime lifelines’ and ‘overseas areas of vital interest’, China would 
also need to shift the focus of its naval strategy to ‘far-seas defence’.83  
A number of military officers have publicly supported the argument that the 
Chinese military should further strengthen its power projection capabilities.84 
Mei Wen, political commissar of China’s ﬁrst aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, once 
stated that ‘in distant seas, [the PLAN] should have capacities to ﬁrmly safeguard 
China’s overseas economic interests and the safety of strategic sea lines of 
communication’.85 However, the Mahanian school of thought is opposed by 
Chinese scholars who advocate China’s continental orientation. Professor Ye 
Zicheng of Peking University is probably the most vocal representative of China’s 
‘continentalist’ faction. He argues that China is essentially a continental country 
in which the development of land power is fundamental and should be prioritized 
over sea power.86 Nonetheless, it should be highlighted that Ye does not oppose 
developing sea power outright, favouring the PLAN’s development of a much 
more limited level of power-projection capabilities. He has suggested that China 
should postpone the plan to build aircraft carriers and should develop its naval 
capabilities to maintain a certain degree of control over only ‘four seas and one 
strait’ namely the Bohai, Yellow, East China and South China seas and the Taiwan 
Strait.87 Regarding the security of other important sea lines of communication 
and seas, China should enhance cooperation with countries neighbouring those 
areas and with international organizations.88 
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The 2013 Defence White Paper discusses the PLA’s task of protecting overseas 
interests, making references to China’s anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden 
and the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya. These two cases illustrate 
the capabilities of the PLAN and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) 
in terms of long-distance operations, which could be perceived as a step towards 
a more active approach to protecting overseas interests. Furthermore, they 
appear to corroborate the fact that the PLAN is developing power-projection 
capabilities that are stronger than Ye’s suggestion. However, these two operations 
are also regarded by China as being in line with non-interference, because of the 
prior consent from the UN and Libya’s neighbouring countries, respectively.  
Another relevant issue is the need to establish military bases overseas, arguably 
a logical implication of China’s ambition to pursue a Mahanian navy.89 Consider-
ing the continued expansion of China’s overseas interests, some Chinese experts 
view this development as inevitable, as it is difficult to carry out long-distance 
mission without permanent overseas bases.90 For instance, the ﬁrst Chinese 
Escort Task Force to the Gulf of Aden encountered supply difficulties during its 
non-stop four-month mission and the following escort ﬂeets therefore decided to 
rely on visiting foreign ports for replenishment.91 Most recently, during the 
ongoing search for the missing Malaysian Airlines aircraft, ﬂight MH370, China’s 
lack of overseas bases has been described as an impediment to its ability to 
conduct efficient and timely rescue missions.92  
Although the Chinese Ministry of National Defence (MND) has repeatedly 
denied intending to set up such bases, there has been occasional speculation as 
well as increasingly heated domestic debate on this issue. The most well-known 
episode was the 2011 invitation by the Seychelles to China to establish a military 
anti-piracy base there, which China did not pursue.93 The port of Gwadar in 
Pakistan, built and operated by China, is also—probably prematurely—cited as a 
potential naval base for China, despite the fact that the surrounding region is 
plagued by an armed insurgency. Furthermore, the port needs further develop-
ment and is geographically ‘an ideal target for air or missile strikes’.94 
While setting up military bases overseas could help protect China’s overseas 
interests, several important factors continue to obstruct its fulﬁlment, including 
China’s lack of technological expertise and reliable host countries, repeated 
commitment to a national defence policy that is purely defensive and concern 
over the resurgence of the ‘China threat’ discourse.95 Some Chinese analysts 
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therefore argue that China will not build ‘Western-style’ military bases overseas 
but could take a gradual approach to ﬁrst set up a relatively long-term and stable 
logistical support and maintenance base.96 However, uneasiness over China’s 
more active posture seems to be unavoidable, and many Indian strategists con-
tinue to believe that their country is being encircled by a ‘string of pearls’.97  
Towards a pragmatic and ﬂexible interpretation of non-interference 
In the light of the above analysis, it appears that moving away from non-
interference is not an option for China in the foreseeable future. The mainstream 
still maintains that the beneﬁts of further adherence outweigh the potential costs 
of a major policy change. However, several policy scholars argue that China’s 
practice of non-interference can be adapted. Their starting point is an historical 
analysis of Chinese foreign policy that shows pragmatism and ﬂexibility 
regarding non-interference.98 Professor Su Changhe of Fudan University argues 
that, while non-interference should be maintained, China should be creative in 
practice. According to him, non-interference does not mean not studying other 
countries’ domestic conditions, and providing no-strings-attached aid does not 
preclude proper audit process and supervision mechanisms.99 Other scholars also 
agree with drawing distinctions between principle and policy practice and 
between strategies and tactics.100 According to Liu Zhongmin, Director of the 
Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, the 
lesson that China learned from its diplomacy during the events of the Arab Spring 
is that it needs ﬂexibility in its foreign policy while adhering to non-inter-
ference.101  
Guo Peiqing, Professor at the Ocean University of China, in his study on China’s 
role in Sudan, comes to the conclusion that China should insist on non-
interference and a no-strings-attached approach to aid on a strategic level and for 
the sake of propaganda, whereas on a tactical level, China needs to ‘meet changes 
by adapting to changes’ and actively study and participate in local affairs in other 
countries—for instance, by increasing contacts with civil society rather than only 
interacting with government agencies and by coordinating with Western 
countries to promote political stability.102 Pragmatism seems to prevail in these 
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scholars’ reﬂections, for which the point of departure is that upholding non-
interference should not amount to a foreign policy straitjacket that is detrimental 
to China’s interests. 
New concepts: constructive involvement and creative involvement 
This pragmatic approach to non-interference has led to the emergence of several 
new concepts. ‘Constructive involvement’ (3
, jianshexing jieru) and 
‘creative involvement’ (6
, chuangzaoxing jieru) are the two that have 
stimulated most academic and policy discussions. Zhao Huasheng of Fudan 
University, a well-known specialist on Central Asia, has crafted the notion of 
‘constructive involvement’. His analysis of the 2010 security crisis in Kyrgyzstan 
concludes that China beneﬁted from the improvement of the situation, which can 
be attributed partly to external involvement, but not to China’s policy of non-
involvement.103  In his opinion, China’s hands-off approach may damage its 
credibility as a reliable regional partner and reinforce the regional impression of 
China as a self-interested outsider. China’s adherence to non-interference should 
not preclude the option of involvement as a ‘tactic’ (,*, celue) in its diplomatic 
toolkit.104 The policies of non-involvement and constructive involvement are both 
important diplomatic ‘means’ (&, shouduan) and ‘available options’ (1+5
 , keneng de xuanze) for China, and the question of which policy is preferred 
depends on China’s interests and capabilities.105  
A series of concrete recommendations have been put forward to describe how 
China could put this concept into practice. For instance, China could act as an 
active peacemaker during regional crises; provide concrete policy advice in lieu 
of vague and neutral declarations; establish high-level diplomatic contacts with 
different political forces in order to reinforce communication channels and inﬂu-
ence; and step up cooperation with regional organizations and possibly other 
major powers to address the root causes of instability.106  
Some Chinese diplomats have also endorsed this concept. Lu Shaye, the 
Director General of the MFA’s Department of African Affairs, has argued that 
China needs to adopt the tactic of ‘constructive involvement’ on the basis of non-
interference.107 According to Lu, in practice, China has already been construct-
ively involved in Africa through three main channels: sending special envoys to 
undertake direct mediation, supporting UN or regional-led mediation initiatives 
and buttressing regional peace operations. These efforts characterize China’s 
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understanding of constructive involvement, namely respecting sovereignty, 
consulting on an equal footing, and promoting peace and impartial dialogues.108  
In a similar vein, Wang Yizhou, inspired by some of China’s recent diplomatic 
initiatives, such as its mediation efforts in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s 
nuclear programme and in Sudan, coined the concept of ‘creative involvement’. A 
major liberal thinker in China on international relations, Wang regards this 
concept as a ‘new and positive attitude’ ("&'#, xinde jiji taidu) and a ‘new 
direction’ ("&, xinde quxiang) that China should pursue in the current 
domestic and international circumstances.109 According to Wang, this concept 
does not contradict non-interference, because the core meaning of non-
interference is that a state’s signiﬁcant internal affairs—such as the political 
system, security arrangements, mode of governance and choice of leaders—
should be decided by a government and its people. As long as other states play an 
active role in helping contribute to this end, their involvement should be con-
sidered neither as a breach nor denial of non-interference, but rather as 
enrichment and development of the concept.110 Creative involvement is also 
different from the US style of ‘interventionism’, because China’s approach is 
characterized by the consent of the parties concerned, support from the UN and 
regional organizations, full exploration of all possible diplomatic means (e.g. 
mediation, good offices and dialogues with conﬂicting parties), and prudent 
attitudes towards the use of force.111  
Developed as a ‘guiding thread’ for China’s diplomacy, creative involvement 
requires proactive measures to take part in international affairs, a greater 
willingness to provide public goods, and stronger support for global governance 
on the part of all the government agencies involving in foreign affairs and the 
Chinese public.112 Areas that have been identiﬁed as appropriate for China’s 
creative involvement include global governance in the high seas, polar regions 
and outer space; multilateral peacekeeping; and the protection of sea lines of 
communication against non-traditional threats.113  
When it comes to what this concept entails in terms of concrete policy and how 
deep China’s involvement could be, much depends on individual circumstances. 
In his analysis of China–Africa relations, Wang Yizhou proposes concrete policy 
recommendations, including ﬁne-tuning China’s non-alliance policy; establishing 
civilian–military dual-use ports in friendly countries for ﬂeet replenishment and 
maintenance; studying and responding to the latest theoretical trends (e.g. in the 
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ﬁelds of democracy, human rights and good governance) in Africa without being 
fettered by ideological dogmatism; and reforming the foreign aid system with a 
greater emphasis on efficiency, transparency, implementation supervision and 
societal participation.114 
However, discussion of these new concepts remain nascent, and while they 
could set a proactive tone and provide more leeway for China’s diplomacy, more 
clariﬁcation is needed on what exactly they mean.115 Several questions remain 
unanswered, including under what conditions China should (or should not) be 
involved, how to assess the results of China’s involvement, and how to withdraw 
should China judge its involvement to have been ineffective or even counter-
productive.116 There is also concern about possible responses by Western states if 
China’s involvement conﬂicts with their interests.117  
Conﬂicting self-identities 
Discussions on the relevance and validity of non-interference in China’s foreign 
policy reveal that Chinese world views continue to be characterized by con-
ﬂicting self-identities, and by the tension created by China’s self image as both a 
major power and as a postcolonial developing country.  
On the one hand, the mainstream domestic discourse recognizes that China is a 
major power, or is at least well on its way to becoming one.118 This explains 
China’s continuous exposure to international norms, its growing sensitivity to 
reputational cost, and its increasingly outward-looking posture designed to pro-
tect its expanding overseas interests. Hence, the compatibility between this 
identity and a commitment to non-interference is tenuous, and the balance be-
tween them requires a less dogmatic approach to non-interference.  
On the other hand, China remains deeply attached to its collective memory of 
victimization, and its self-identity as a developing country struggling to reclaim 
its national grandeur continues to inﬂuence Chinese intellectuals’ mindsets. This 
self-identity in turn generates anxieties that any compromise on non-interference 
could backﬁre, as well as a self-image of China as a moral force defending non-
interference on behalf of other developing countries. As these identities are likely 
to continue to co-exist, China’s adherence to non-interference will continue to be 
plagued by competing considerations.  
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3. Protecting China’s energy interests overseas  
Over just two decades, China has evolved from being a net exporter of oil to 
challenge the USA as the world’s top oil importer in 2014.119 Chinese overseas 
energy interests continue to grow rapidly, often in politically unstable countries 
in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. As a result, Chinese companies 
operating in these regions face increasing political and security risks (although 
these are not necessarily targeted at China), including armed conﬂict, political 
instability, terrorism, corruption, organized crime and piracy. Chinese analysts 
usually blame this situation on China’s latecomer status (
, houlaizhe) on 
the global energy scene, which has forced Chinese oil companies to move into 
politically risky areas that have not yet been exploited or have been abandoned by 
international competitors. Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) see this as 
both an opportunity and a challenge. For example, from the point of view of an 
NOC such as Sinopec, ‘although this provides a good opportunity for Chinese oil 
companies to “go into Africa”, they also face great risks for their investments and 
development’.120 
Despite these growing risks, attacks on Chinese energy assets abroad, both 
upstream (i.e. exploration and production) and midstream (i.e. transportation by 
pipeline, rail, ship or truck), have so far been rare. Unlike the protection of 
nationals overseas (see chapter 4), ensuring energy security by protecting energy 
interests abroad lacks a human security angle, unless it involves threats to 
individual workers. This, combined with the culture of corporate secrecy on the 
part of China’s large, state-owned NOCs—which operate in an industry that 
attaches great importance to conﬁdentiality—explains why the issue attracts far 
less public debate than the security of Chinese citizens abroad.  
Chinese leaders and the NOCs perceive the problem of securing Chinese 
energy assets abroad as primarily economic in nature, and as one that can be 
solved by managing risks and insuring losses. Although there has been no radical 
change in China’s policy on this issue—for example, by starting to use the PLA to 
protect energy assets abroad—China continues to adapt to the rapidly changing 
risk environment resulting from the globalization of its energy interests. Changes, 
when they do occur, mostly take place within individual companies, especially 
through strengthened capabilities in risk assessment, crisis management and 
insurance. In contrast, the Chinese Government remains reluctant to adopt a 
proactive approach that might be seen as breaking with the non-interference 
principle, and instead maintains a cautious approach, despite the symbiotic 
relationship between the CPC, the government and the NOCs. Nevertheless, the 
government is increasingly diversifying its diplomatic outreach beyond official 
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contacts with governments and local elites, and moving towards mediation 
between conﬂict parties.  
The central question is how China can protect its energy interests abroad by 
protecting the stability of energy source countries—or, in the words of one expert 
from the China University of Petroleum in Beijing, how China can be a ‘respon-
sible energy importing country’ (	
, fuzeren de nengyuan 
jinkou guojia) without getting too deeply involved in regional or local conﬂicts.121 
This chapter examines China’s efforts to adapt its diplomatic approach to new 
realities, and the limits imposed by the traditional non-interference principle. So 
far, serious challenges to Chinese energy interests (and other economic interests) 
have not proven strong enough to force a radical change in China’s foreign policy. 
In fact, China still lacks both a coherent diplomatic strategy and the institutional 
framework required to actively protect its energy interests abroad.  
Security and political risks for Chinese overseas energy interests 
The vast majority of Chinese oil and gas imports originate in politically unstable 
regions in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. Chinese NOCs and their 
international competitors all face political and security risks in these regions. 
These risks are becoming increasingly prominent, both in the official rhetoric of 
Chinese leaders and in academic debates on energy security. However, attacks on 
Chinese energy interests abroad have so far been rare and discussions about the 
link between protecting these interests and the principle of non-interference are 
mostly hypothetical.  
Chinese energy security is inextricably linked to the continued stable 
development of China’s economy, and thus to the legitimacy of the CPC. As the 
Party leadership presses ahead with urbanization and rebalancing the economy, 
the pressure to secure energy resources abroad will rise accordingly. BP projects 
that China will replace Europe as the world’s leading energy importer by 2030.122 
China’s energy mix in 2011 was dominated by coal (69 per cent of the total energy 
mix), while hydrocarbons made up a less than one-quarter of the total (18 per 
cent oil and 4 per cent natural gas).123 Mostly because of this reliance on coal, 
China surpassed the USA as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 
2006–2007.124 As Chinese leaders pursue strategies to cut coal-related emissions 
of carbon dioxide and other pollutants, the percentage of hydrocarbons in China’s 
energy mix will most likely rise in the future. In 2013 China accounted for nearly 
one-third of global growth in demand for oil and is likely to surpass the USA in 
net oil imports on an annual basis in 2014.125 China’s National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) wants natural gas to make up 10 per cent of China’s 
 
121 Chinese energy policy expert, Interview with authors, Beijing, Jan. 2013 (author’s translation). 
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overall energy consumption mix by 2020, up from 4 per cent in 2011.126 BP 
estimates that China will account for around one-quarter of global growth in 
demand for gas between 2013 and 2030, despite having the second-largest 
domestic shale gas production potential (after the USA).127 
Chinese NOCs will therefore continue to be in the vanguard of China’s ‘go 
global’ (, zou chuqu) strategy, especially in the context of energy security.128 
In terms of foreign direct investment, 7 of China’s top 10 companies outside the 
ﬁnance sector in 2012 (all of which are state-owned) are involved in the overseas 
oil and gas sectors, including both upstream and midstream activities. The list is 
headed by China’s three large NOCs (the so-called ‘three oil barrels’ (, san 
tong you): Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).129 All three companies are closely 
tied to the Chinese Government and to the CPC—both CNPC and Sinopec have 
ministerial rank status, while CNOOC is a lower-ranking general bureau in the 
Chinese State Council.130 A large percentage of the crude oil produced by Chinese 
NOCs overseas is not shipped directly to China but sold instead on the inter-
national market. According to one estimate, in 2007 Chinese NOCs sold at least 
40 per cent of their overseas oil production (approximately 300 000 barrels per 
day) on the global market, including all of the oil extracted by Chinese NOCs in 
Syria and Tunisia.131 Nevertheless, the majority of China’s oil imports originate 
from politically unstable regions (see table 3.1). 
Despite the fact that China sources much of its energy supply from unstable 
parts of the world, direct attacks on overseas facilities run by Chinese NOCs or on 
transportation routes are rare, with only 10 mostly small-scale direct attacks on 
Chinese overseas oil and gas interests in the period 2004–14.132 However, Chinese 
analysts are becoming increasingly aware of the potential threat of attack and 
have identiﬁed a number of risks for Chinese energy interests abroad. For 
example, Li Zhongmin of the CASS Institute of World Economics and Politics 
identiﬁes six categories of risks faced by Chinese companies operating abroad, 
 
126 Poorsafar, H., ‘China’s energy rebalancing: a new gazpolitik?’, The Diplomat, 18 Nov. 2013, <http:// 
thediplomat.com/2013/11/chinas-energy-rebalancing-a-new-gazpolitik/>. 
127 British Petroleum (note 122), p. 49.  
128 According to one recent deﬁnition, China’s ‘go global’ strategy ‘entails active participation in 
international competition and cooperation through foreign direct investment, foreign project contracting, 
foreign labour cooperation and other related activities, in order to achieve China’s modernization strategy 
through sustainable economic development’. Yu, L. and Xiao J., ‘’ [Outline of the ‘go 
global’ strategy], Qiaowu Gongzuo Yanjiu, no. 2 (2011), <http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/159/1743.shtml>. 
129 Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), ‘2012 
		 100’ [Top 100 Chinese 
transnational corporations in 2012 outside the banking sector], [n.d.], <http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
hzs/201309/20130913152843102.pdf>. The 4 other top-10 companies involved in the overseas oil and gas 
sectors are China Ocean Shipping Group Company (COSCO), Sinochem Exploration, China Merchants 
Group Ltd and China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC).  
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including political, economic, policy, social and operational risks, as well as 
natural disasters.133  
Similarly, in December 2012 CASS hosted a forum on overseas risk 
management for Chinese companies that brought together representatives from 
academia, Chinese Government agencies (including the MFA, MOFCOM and the 
NDRC), policy banks and insurance companies, and major state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs), including CNPC.134 The participants identiﬁed four major threats 
to Chinese economic interests abroad, including energy interests: (a) ‘creeping’ 
expropriation (*2!10, canshixing zhengyong fengxian), especially in 
Latin America; (b) terrorism and politically motivated kidnappings and extortion; 
(c) social disturbances, unrest and civil war; and (d) ‘negative changes’ in host 
governments’ policies.135  
In the light of these typologies, the following subsections analyse ﬁve broad 
themes in the Chinese debate on political and security risks to energy interests 
abroad: political instability and regime change; resource nationalism; terrorism; 
conﬂict between states; and geopolitical risk. Only two of these themes—conﬂict 
between states and geopolitical risk—are linked to traditional external security 
threats, while the other three represent domestic or non-traditional threats. The 
growing number of intrastate conﬂicts seems to have been reﬂected by Chinese 
experiences during the Arab Spring, especially in Libya and Syria. In the context 
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Table 3.1. Top 10 sources of Chinese oil imports, 2013 
 
  Volume  Change,  
Rank Country (m. tonnes) 2012–13 (%)  
1 Saudi Arabia 53.90  –0.03 
2 Angola 40.01  –0.38 
3 Oman  25.47  +30.18 
4 Russia 24.35  +0.07 
5 Iraq 23.51  +49.92 
6 Iran 21.44 –2.21 
7 Venezuela  15.75 +2.98 
8 Kazakhstan  11.95 +11.93 
9 United Arab Emirates  10.26 +17.52 
10 Kuwait 9.34 –10.92  
Source: Sina, ‘2013
$-	.) -	’ [China’s oil import growth slows 
down in 2013, shows diversiﬁcation of import sources], Xinhua, 2 Feb. 2014.  
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of China’s traditional non-interference policy, the focus on perceived intrastate 
risks to Chinese energy interests abroad poses a signiﬁcant challenge for Chinese 
foreign policy. 
Political instability and regime change 
Chinese analysts repeatedly mention the potential for Arab Spring-style uprisings 
in Central Asia as a threat to Chinese interests, including energy interests.136 
However, most experts interviewed for this Policy Paper doubt that Central Asia 
will witness social upheavals similar to those in the Middle East during the Arab 
Spring.  
Mainstream Chinese analysts view Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan—the two 
countries hosting China’s largest energy interests in the region—as politically 
stable. A majority of Chinese analysts are optimistic that the potential political 
risks to Chinese energy interests in Kazakhstan are minimal. They point to the 
absence of ethnic conﬂict in the country and to the ‘wise policies’ of the current 
Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev.137 However, some question whether his 
eventual successor will be equally apt at managing domestic forces in Kazakh-
stan, and whether China would be in a position to protect its energy interests in 
the country should the political situation deteriorate.138 Turkmenistan has had 
one peaceful transition of power, following the death of long-time President 
Saparmurat Niyazov, to Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Some Chinese analysts 
even contend that the closed nature of Turkmenistan’s political and social system 
shields it from foreign inﬂuences that might threaten the stability of the 
country.139  
Political instability or regime change in Central Asia would endanger one of 
China’s most ambitious energy projects in the region, the Central Asia–China gas 
pipeline, the ﬁrst branch of which was completed in 2009. The pipeline connects 
the Turkmen reserves in Samandepe with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and ﬁnally 
Khorgos in Xinjiang, western China. The pipeline, which delivered 27.8 billion 
cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas to China in 2013, is expected to deliver 30 bcm 
of natural gas annually, with a potential increase to 50 bcm (although this would 
require substantial upgrades).140 Turkmenistan is now by far China’s largest 
supplier of natural gas, having provided more than one-half of China’s imports by 
2012.141  
 
136 Chinese Central Asia academic, Interview with authors, Shanghai, Jan. 2013. 
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Although the Central Asia–China pipeline has not yet been able to meet its full 
potential, Turkmenistan plans to increase its annual gas exports to China to 65 
bcm by 2020, which would dwarf the 10 bcm Turkmenistan exported to Russia—
formerly Turkmenistan’s largest importer and (re-exporter) of natural gas—in 
2012. In September 2013, during his ﬁrst official trip to Turkmenistan since  
the leadership change, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with President 
Berdymukhamedov to inaugurate the world’s second-largest gas ﬁeld, the 
Galkynysh ﬁeld, which is estimated to hold up to 21.2 trillion cubic metres of gas 
reserves and will supply an additional 25 bcm a year to China by 2020, on top of 
existing contracts to increase shipments by 20 bcm in coming years. The ﬁeld will 
be operated by CNPC and will be connected to the Central Asia–China pipeline 
through a new branch (‘Line D’), which will be built in 2016 and run via 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Xinjiang.142  
Resource nationalism 
Another concern is rising anti-Chinese sentiments among populations in host 
countries and the emergence of opposition parties that pursue populist policies 
aimed at reducing Chinese inﬂuence in their countries by demanding the 
nationalization of Chinese-run energy projects or by limiting the inﬂux of 
Chinese businesses and traders.  
The problem of resource nationalism seems to have become increasingly severe 
in Kazakhstan. Although some tensions may stem from historical territorial 
conﬂicts along the China–Kazakhstan border, much of the anger is directed at the 
perceived Chinese ‘takeover’ of Kazakh resources. Tensions have been exacer-
bated by reports that the Kazakh Government had permitted Chinese oil 
companies to operate according to Chinese labour laws, thereby circumventing 
Kazakh labour laws and union activities.143 In 2007 hundreds of workers from the 
China-Petroleum Everbright Energy Technology Company (CPEEC), a branch of 
CNPC, organized protests over wages and working conditions, with local 
newspapers denouncing the Chinese as ‘exploiters of the Kazakh people’.144  
In May 2011 Azat, Kazakhstan’s leading opposition party, called for street 
demonstrations to protest against growing business ties with China, describing 
Chinese activities in the oilﬁelds as a ‘threat to the independence of the country 
and national security’.145 In the same month, workers at an oil ﬁeld jointly owned 
by China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) and the 
Kazakh state-owned oil company, KazMunayGas, staged a partial hunger strike 
and were later joined by union members. Although a court found the strike to be 
illegal, the action continued until the end of the year.146 Kazakh politicians and 
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media have condemned what they see as China’s aggressive expansion and lack of 
transparency in the oil sector, and expressed concerns regarding ‘Chinese com-
petition and the deterioration of the labour market’.147  
However, few Chinese analysts see these complaints as being a result of China’s 
increasing economic activity in the region. Instead, they blame (a) opportunistic 
local politicians using what Chinese leaders have termed ‘China threat theories’  
(, zhongguo weixie lun) to make China look like a threat to other coun-
tries and to damage incumbent leaders; (b) the Russian-language media’s 
continued use of anti-Chinese cold war-era propaganda themes (which explains 
why these sentiments are strongest in Russia and Central Asian countries such as 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where Russian continues to be the most commonly 
used language); and (c) outside (e.g. Western) forces ‘jealous of China’s successful 
Central Asia policies’. Analysts insist that increasing economic and social ex-
changes will eventually lead to a better understanding of China’s benign 
intentions in the region.148 
Resource nationalism has also affected the China–Myanmar Pipeline Project, 
which consists of crude oil and natural gas pipelines and is jointly invested and 
built by CNPC, Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), two South Korean 
companies (Daewoo International and Korea Gas Corporation, KOGAS) and two 
Indian companies (Indian Oil Corporation and GAIL Ltd). Construction of the 
pipelines’ Myanmar section began in June 2010 and the gas pipeline became 
operational in July 2013. It is expected to send 12 bcm of natural gas annually to 
Myanmar and to south-west China.149 The oil pipeline is expected to send up to 
440 000 barrels of oil per day from Myanmar’s port of Kyaukpyu overland to 
China and should have been operational by June 2014. The project is intended to 
decrease Chinese reliance on sea-based transport of hydrocarbons through the 
Malacca Strait. Since the official end of direct military rule in 2011, Myanmar has 
seen a rise in anti-Chinese sentiment that is also increasingly affecting the 
pipeline project. In January 2014 the construction site for the oil pipeline was hit 
by quarrels between Chinese and local workers and by an arson attack.150 
In extreme cases, resource nationalism and economic protectionism can lead to 
the nationalization of foreign energy projects. For example, despite excellent 
relations with the Venezuelan Government, the local operations of two Chinese 
NOCs—CNPC and Sinopec—were still subjected to nationalization in 2006 when 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez decided to more strictly enforce 2001 legisla-
tion governing foreign companies’ involvement in the hydrocarbon sector in 
Venezuela. All Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) contracts signed with foreign 
oil companies were reviewed and re-signed, under the threat of asset 
expropriation if companies refused to comply, with PDVSA taking 80 per cent 
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control of CNPC’s Intercampo and Caracoles ﬁelds and forcing Sinopec to hand 
over a majority stake in its Venezuelan operations.151 
Terrorism 
Chinese energy assets overseas have also been the target of terrorist attacks, 
especially in Africa and the Middle East. The most brutal attacks occurred in 
Ethiopia’s Somali region in April 2007, when 65 Ethiopians and 9 Chinese Sino-
pec oil workers were killed, and 7 Chinese were taken captive in an attack on the 
Abole oil ﬁeld by the separatist Ogaden National Liberation Front.152 In March 
2011 Sinopec was forced to halt crude oil production in Yemen, partially in 
response to the rise of al-Qaeda-related violence. Armed clashes caused the 
destruction of a pipeline and 30 Sinopec employees were evacuated soon after.153 
Production was ﬁnally resumed in July 2012.154 
Despite these incidents, political instability and the risk of terrorism in the 
Middle East and North Africa have so far failed to discourage Chinese NOCs from 
intensifying their operations in the region (e.g. in Iraq). According to one leading 
Chinese energy analyst, there are at least four reasons for this persistence. First, 
China will continue to rely on oil imports from the region. Second, China has 
already invested a considerable amount of money in the Middle Eastern energy 
sector and it cannot abandon these investments. Third, China is interested in 
attracting more capital from Arab investors, which would be facilitated through 
continued business contacts in the energy sector. Fourth, Chinese companies 
beneﬁt from Arab markets by trading Chinese products and by carrying out 
infrastructure projects.155 Another Chinese expert states that, despite the security 
risks, China will have no option but to increase its investments in the Middle East 
over the next 15 years.156  
Conﬂict between states 
With regard to energy shipments from Central Asia, domestic instability does not 
appear to be the biggest concern for Chinese analysts, most of whom are more 
concerned about tensions between states in the region. The scenario that some 
analysts seem to fear the most is a situation similar to the disputes between 
Russia and Ukraine in the 2000s, when disagreements over gas prices led to 
shortages of supply in Western Europe.157 One Urumqi-based Chinese analyst 
was critical of the inclusion of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as transit 
countries for the China–Central Asia gas pipeline. In his view, this would lead to 
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‘coordination problems’ (, xietiao wenti), as even minor interstate 
disputes over maintenance costs could lead to disruption of supplies.158  
Geopolitical risk 
Chinese experts are also debating the question of the USA’s so-called ‘rebalancing 
to Asia’ and US energy independence and its impact on the security of Chinese 
energy interests.159 Dong Xiucheng, a Professor at China Petroleum University, 
warns that the USA’s long-term decreased reliance on oil and gas from the Middle 
East may leave it with insufficient motivation to safeguard local oil and gas 
production sites and maritime transportation routes that also lead to East Asia. 
This might affect Chinese energy interests by leading to long-term chaos in the 
Middle East and by prolonging the currently high oil and gas prices in East 
Asia.160 Other Chinese analysts disagree. One think tank expert believes that the 
USA will continue providing security in the Middle East, although to a lesser 
degree than in the past. In his opinion, the USA will continue to import a 
signiﬁcant amount of oil from the region and will remain interested in Middle 
East security through the ‘global war on terrorism’.161 Another analyst suggested 
that a lack of US energy interests in the Middle East might make it even easier for 
the USA to ‘cause trouble’ in the region.162 Still others detect a risk of ‘Western 
obstruction’ (, xifang zu’ai fengxian). For example, one industry 
analyst claims that, in order to contain China’s growing inﬂuence and cooper-
ation in Africa, Western countries have politicized the energy issue by promul-
gating the ‘China threat theory’, and by claiming that China is pursuing 
neocolonial policies in Africa, thus endangering Chinese energy interests in the 
region.163 
China’s diplomatic mediation and outreach  
Many Chinese experts express doubts as to whether China’s near-total reliance 
on high-level leadership contacts is sufficient to protect Chinese interests abroad, 
arguing that it can even be counterproductive if a regime loses the support of its 
people. Chinese analysts therefore support intensifying contacts with actors 
other than governments, including opposition groups, local non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and religious organizations.164  
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The Chinese Government has met with some opposition groups. For example, 
Syrian opposition representatives visited China on four occasions in 2012 and 
2013. However, although these delegations met with high-ranking officials from 
the MFA (including the Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi) and the International 
Department of the CPC’s Central Committee, they were not officially invited by 
the MFA, but rather by the quasi-official Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign 
Affairs (CPIFA).165 One Chinese expert on the Middle East, who advises the MFA 
and attended three of the meetings, described how the Syrian delegates’ initial 
‘anti-Chinese’ approach became a friendly one. In his view, such contacts do not 
constitute interference, since the Syrian Government also calls for dialogue with 
the opposition. In addition, in contrast to the West, China does not threaten or 
force other countries to act against their will, but instead ‘encourages them to act 
in their own best interest’.166 Another example is Afghanistan, where China has 
long maintained contacts with both the Afghan Government and local clans and 
religious groups (including the Taliban) in order to protect Chinese interests in 
the country.167 
For the NOCs, the active support of the Chinese authorities can be both a 
blessing and a curse. On the one hand, diplomatic means can be used to establish 
good relations between host governments and the NOCs, and China’s growing 
political, economic and military clout might deter governments or NGOs from 
damaging Chinese energy interests. On the other hand, this association can be 
costly, especially in societies that are critical of China’s political regime or its 
domestic and global policies.168  
The most prominent example of China’s approach—and the mixed outcomes 
that it can produce—is the case of Chinese energy companies in South Sudan and 
Sudan. Despite the Chinese Government’s attempts at mediation, several serious 
incidents have caused major damage to both Chinese investments and workers in 
the oil sectors of South Sudan and Sudan, thus illustrating the limits of China’s 
traditional policy of non-interference.  
In 2011 Sudan was China’s second largest provider of crude oil in Africa after 
Angola, supplying 5 per cent of China’s total crude oil imports.169 After the 
shutdown of South Sudan’s oil sector in early 2012, combined imports from South 
Sudan and Sudan dropped to less than 1 per cent.170 Political instability and 
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security threats in the region have also had a negative effect on the operations of 
Chinese NOCs. Both South Sudan and Sudan host CNPC’s largest foreign oper-
ation. According to some Chinese sources, CNPC had invested around $7 billion 
by 2012 and holds plurality or majority stakes in three of the ﬁve largest oil 
consortia operating in the two countries.171 While the majority of oil reserves are 
located in South Sudan, most of the reﬁneries, pipelines and export terminals in 
which Chinese companies have invested are located in Sudan.172  
China as a mediator: the conﬂict in Darfur 
Citing the non-interference principle, China initially backed the regime of 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in the conﬂict in Sudan’s Darfur region. In a 
2005 interview, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong, 
remarked: ‘Business is business. We try to separate politics from business . . . I 
think the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a 
position to impose upon them.’173 This attitude was also illustrated by China’s 
actions in the UN Security Council. For example, between 2004 and 2006 China 
abstained from voting on six UN Security Council resolutions that would have 
imposed ﬁnancial and travel sanctions on Sudanese leaders, including Resolution 
1564, which would have targeted Sudan’s oil sector and thus affected China’s oil 
interests in Sudan.174 China faced a barrage of international criticism for its stand, 
which threatened to tarnish its image in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olym-
pics.  
In addition, there were increasing threats to Chinese operations and workers in 
Sudan. Although the vast majority of the Chinese-run oil facilities are not located 
in Darfur, the violence also affected neighbouring areas, primarily South 
Kordofan province. In October 2007 the Defra oil ﬁeld—which is run by a 
Chinese-led consortium, Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC)—
was attacked by the Darfur-based rebel group Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM). A JEM commander, Mohamed Bahr Hamdeen, justiﬁed the attack by 
pointing to Chinese support for the Sudanese Government: ‘The latest attack is a 
message to the Chinese companies in particular. [They] are the biggest investors 
in the Sudanese oil industry.’ Hamdeen gave the oil companies in South Kordofan 
a week to leave Sudan, stating that the rebels ‘consider [all foreign oil companies] 
killers because they help the government buy the weapons which they use to kill 
women and children’.175  
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In December 2007 JEM attacked another Chinese-run oil ﬁeld in South 
Kordofan. The Darfur-based JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim justiﬁed the attack on 
Heglig oilﬁeld—which is operated by Great Wall Drilling Company, a subsidiary 
of CNPC—by stating that ‘China is trading petroleum for our blood’.176 Finally, in 
October 2008 a group of militants with alleged links to JEM kidnapped nine 
CNPC employees from an oil ﬁeld in South Kordofan, and ﬁve of the hostages 
were killed during the ordeal.177  
Consequently, China began to take on a more active role as a mediator in 
Darfur, encouraging dialogue and economic development, and appointing a 
special envoy, Liu Guijin, to enhance ‘mutual understanding through communi-
cations and talks’.178 At the 2008 handover ceremony for a 20 million yuan ($2.9 
million) aid package to Sudan, Liu expressed China’s commitment ‘to working 
closely with the Sudanese unity government and the transitional authorities in 
Darfur for the beneﬁt of the people, for the end of people’s suffering and for a 
long-lasting settlement of the Darfur issue’. During Liu’s visit, he also explained 
China’s position in meetings with representatives of opposition parties in 
Darfur.179 However, Liu stated that China did not have formal direct contact with 
rebel forces in the Darfur region.180  
In addition, China supported the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to 
Darfur, which was followed by the establishment of the AU/UN Hybrid Oper-
ation in Darfur (UNAMID). The issue was reportedly raised in the course of Pres-
ident Hu’s state visit to Sudan in February 2007, during which he also visited a 
Chinese-built oil reﬁnery.181 In November 2007 and July 2008 China sent a total 
of 315 engineering corps personnel to Sudan to serve with UNAMID.182 
China as a mediator: the conﬂict between South Sudan and Sudan  
China began building relations with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the 
SPLM and the Sudanese Government in January 2005, which paved the way for 
the eventual independence of South Sudan in 2011.183 Salva Kiir, Deputy Chair-
man of the SPLM, visited China in March 2005 after becoming Sudan’s First 
Vice-President and again in 2007 when he became President of autonomous 
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Southern Sudan.184 During his 2007 visit, Kiir met with President Hu and 
presented Chinese officials with a map indicating that most of Sudan’s oil 
reserves were located in Southern Sudan.185 China opened a consulate in the 
South Sudanese capital of Juba in September 2008 and was among the ﬁrst states 
to recognize the newly independent state of South Sudan in July 2011.186  
The relationship between South Sudan and Sudan was tense from the start. 
The ﬂow of oil through pipelines from oil ﬁelds in South Sudan to export 
terminals on Sudan’s Red Sea coast was halted between January 2012 and March 
2013 in a dispute over transit fees and border demarcation issues, which had a 
severe impact on Chinese energy interests.187 Liu Yingcai, the head of the CNPC-
led Petrodar consortium, was accused of collaborating with the Sudanese 
Government to conﬁscate and divert South Sudanese crude oil, and in February 
2012 he was expelled from South Sudan.188 The Chinese MFA refused to openly 
support CNPC or intervene.189 CNPC has since intensiﬁed its corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) activities in South Sudan, ﬁnancing social projects in Juba 
and training for petroleum specialists and scholarships in China for talented local 
students.190  
China as a mediator: the conﬂict in South Sudan  
In December 2013 ﬁghting broke out between forces loyal to South Sudanese 
President Salva Kiir and a breakaway SPLM faction led by former Vice-President 
Riek Machar. South Sudan’s oil production fell by 45 000 barrels per day to 
200 000 barrels per day as a result of the violence, and Chinese NOCs were 
forced to evacuate approximately 400 Chinese oil workers.191 Despite the fact 
that it was a domestic conﬂict, the Chinese MFA immediately took a proactive 
role. China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, called for a ceaseﬁre and a political 
dialogue between the two sides. He also called on the South Sudanese Govern-
ment to protect Chinese citizens and their property in the country.192 Wang 
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announced that he was ‘ready to directly engage’ with the parties to the conﬂict 
and met with their representatives during ceaseﬁre negotiations in early January 
2014 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, conducting an active shuttle diplomacy between 
the two sides.193 By May 2014 China had contributed 341 troops and 13 police 
officers to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).194 By March 2014 oil 
output had already fallen by about one-third since the start of the conﬂict.195 
Despite a ceaseﬁre agreement on 23 January 2014 and a peace deal on 9 May 
2014, the ﬁghting has continued.  
China’s mixed track record on the Sudanese conﬂicts shows the limits of its 
non-interference approach with regard to protecting its energy interests abroad. 
Even China’s diplomacy on South Sudan has been reactive and aimed mostly at 
limiting the damage to Chinese energy and other interests after the conﬂict had 
escalated into a civil war. It remains to be seen whether an adaptation of Chinese 
policies will lead to a more proactive conﬂict-prevention approach in the future.  
Chinese national oil companies’ risk-assessment and crisis-response 
activities 
Despite a signiﬁcant increase in diplomatic activity in relation to its overseas 
energy interests, the Chinese Government’s support for NOCs in crisis regions 
overseas remains limited. China has been reluctant to throw its full weight 
behind the NOCs, fearing that this could be interpreted as interference in the 
domestic affairs of their host countries. Therefore, the NOCs themselves have 
begun to develop strategies and mechanisms—including risk-assessment capabili-
ties, increased CSR activities and investments in political risk insurance—to 
assess and manage political and security risks when operating abroad. However, 
as the example of Sudan shows, outsiders often see NOCs as representatives of 
the Chinese state. 
The inﬂuence of SOEs on Chinese foreign policy is growing. One Chinese 
expert has called this phenomenon the ‘corporatization of the country’ (
, guojia de gongsihua).196 The symbiotic relationship between the CPC, the 
Chinese Government and the NOCs raises the question of how much 
responsibility the state should shoulder when it comes to risks to overseas 
investments. This issue is hotly debated within China. Some analysts point out 
that a mix of commercial and political interests continues to drive the overseas 
activities of the NOCs. In many cases, this leads to investments that are not 
economically sound and which can lead to losses for the companies and the state, 
such as investments in politically unstable countries. Increasing investment by 
private companies could be a solution to this problem, since these companies do 
not have the backing of the state and are thus more prudent when it comes to risk 
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assessment. Analysts therefore advocate a dual strategy to minimize risks and 
losses for the state. First, China should enact laws and regulations that would 
prohibit SOEs from investing in high-risk areas. Second, it should set up an 
insurance system requiring SOEs to cover their own losses through regular con-
tributions.197 
In addition, the Chinese Government wants to avoid being drawn into conﬂicts 
or to attract unwanted attention through the activities of NOCs in conﬂict zones, 
either through threats to Chinese employees or attacks on Chinese-run facilities. 
As one high-ranking policy researcher working within a Chinese NOC put it, 
Chinese companies are responsible for choosing their own investment destin-
ations and thus are expected ‘to avoid causing any embarrassment to the country’ 
(30 2, bu yao gei guojia shenme diulian).198 Since the heads of 
Chinese NOCs are political leaders appointed by the CPC’s Central Committee, 
their careers can also be negatively affected by security-related losses abroad.199  
Improving risk assessment capabilities  
Since official support remains limited, Chinese NOCs and other companies have 
been encouraged to expand their risk-assessment and crisis-management toolkits 
in order to independently deal with political and security risks. These 
assessments are becoming an integral part of the official approval procedure for 
investments in high-risk areas overseas.  
Central SOEs, including the NOCs, need to apply to the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the NDRC, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and MOFCOM to receive an invest-
ment permit. In 2005 the State Council forwarded a notice regarding the 
strengthening of security for overseas Chinese enterprises and personnel to 
MOFCOM and other relevant departments.200 In 2010 the State Council issued a 
revised notice including regulations to help Chinese companies deal with both 
traditional and non-traditional security issues, especially terrorism-related 
threats. Article 21 of the regulations reads:  
Before Chinese enterprises invest in high-risk countries or regions, they must commission 
a professional security organization to conduct a security risk assessment. In order to 
minimize security risks abroad as much as possible, Chinese enterprises investing overseas 
must reﬁne their overseas security plan based on the security risk assessment report.201 
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In addition, the NDRC issues a Catalogue of Investment Projects Subject to 
Governmental Veriﬁcations. The 2013 version of the catalogue requires NDRC 
veriﬁcation for outbound investments by centrally-administered state-owned 
enterprises (CASOEs) or investments involving sensitive countries and regions. It 
deﬁnes ‘sensitive countries’ as ‘countries and regions which China does not have 
diplomatic relationship with, or are under international sanction, or embroiled in 
ongoing war or riots’.202  
However, according to one Beijing-based analyst working for a major Western 
risk consultancy, these requests do not follow a standardized procedure and in 
many cases the applying SOEs treat them purely as a formality.203 In any case, the 
responsibility to assess security risks is shared among a number of institutions 
without a clear division of labour, which exacerbates the current problems with 
Chinese risk assessment capabilities.  
The Chinese MFA plays only a marginal role, and holds no veto power over the 
foreign investment decisions of NOCs. Despite NOCs’ lack of experience and 
understanding of the situation overseas, most Chinese observers consider them to 
be much more inﬂuential players that only turn to the MFA once they encounter 
serious problems abroad.204 One Chinese expert called the MFA an ‘implementer’ 
(, zhixingzhe) of state policies that does not have the power to assert itself 
with regards the NOCs.205 In theory, the two Chinese policy banks—China 
Development Bank (CDB) and China Exim Bank—can also inﬂuence the invest-
ment behaviours of Chinese NOCs. These banks provide loans for major 
investments both at home and abroad and, since they are becoming increasingly 
commercialized, should be interested in avoiding losses from investments in 
unstable environments. In addition, as one Chinese scholar remarked, foreign 
investors are gaining increased inﬂuence over policy banks (e.g. through seats on 
their advisory boards). This might make the banks less willing to support risky 
investments of questionable commercial value.206  
Some SOEs have improved their internal structures and processes for assessing 
risks, both before an operation is initiated abroad and while it is running. 
However, according to the vice-director of the Chinese MFA’s Consular Pro-
tection Centre, the ‘lack of security risk awareness of ﬁrms’ continues to be a 
major problem. 207 Although there is a general trend towards greater 
institutionalization of security risks management, most ﬁrms lack standard 
operating procedures to prevent incidents and handle crises. Only a few SOEs 
have offices and researchers in charge of risk assessment, and even fewer have 
chief security officers, either at headquarters or in overseas offices. Firms that 
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have established overseas risk-assessment units focus on ﬁnancial risks, such as 
exchange or commodities rates or minimum revenue requirements, rather than 
on political risks, and mostly recruit individuals with a background in ﬁnance or 
economics.208  
Chinese NOCs have started to build up their own risk-assessment capabilities. 
For example, CNPC has established an information network linking Chinese 
Government departments, the host government, international security organ-
izations, and local staff in order to strengthen the assessment of terrorism and 
security risks. Other information measures introduced by CNPC include  
(a) timely early security warnings in accordance with changes in the local 
security situation and daily security reports in high-risk countries, (b) weekly 
reports on overseas projects and community situations, (c) monthly reports on 
security developments, and (d) quarterly announcements on society and 
community risks.209 CNPC has also established its own security risk-assessment 
database and intensiﬁed security risk assessment and geopolitical research on 
high-risk countries such as Chad, Iraq, Niger, Sudan and Turkmenistan.210 The 
security risk-assessment department of CNOOC provides both country analyses 
and country-speciﬁc travel guides for employees travelling to high-risk areas.211 
In addition, NOCs are intensifying their exchanges with external actors and, in 
some cases, have even outsourced some country- or region-speciﬁc tasks to 
academics and analysts at universities and state-run think tanks. These experts 
can provide authoritative analyses from an ‘independent’ (i.e. external to the 
company) perspective. For example, Sinopec has commissioned a Middle East 
specialist from the CASS Institute of West Asian and African Studies to inspect 
and provide advice on its natural gas projects in Yemen.212 The Xinjiang Academy 
of Social Sciences and Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics provide 
similar consultancy services to CNPC regarding security risks to Chinese energy 
investments in Central Asia.213 
Chinese NOCs also employ Western multinational risk consultancies. However, 
analysts are still undecided as to whether China will be the next big market for 
Western providers of security risk assessment and security services. While one 
analyst at a major Western risk consultancy thought that their work was regarded 
as more authoritative and independent than that of Chinese experts, a political 
risk analyst from a Chinese SOE disagreed, stating that Western ﬁrms were 
unable to provide services that cater to the speciﬁc needs of Chinese com-
panies.214  
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Corporate social responsibility  
Once an overseas energy project has been approved and is operational, a Chinese 
NOC will usually apply a number of additional measures to minimize risks and 
avoid security incidents. Of these, most Chinese analysts see CSR measures as a 
vital and effective tool to improve relations between NOCs and local communities 
and to mitigate the political and security risks that NOCs face overseas. Chinese 
NOCs are engaged in a number of CSR activities in host countries, including 
supporting local communities by building schools, hospitals and roads and by 
providing vocational training and education for locals, as well as environmental 
protection. However, compared to their Western counterparts, Chinese NOCs are 
relative latecomers. For example, CNPC only established its CSR reporting 
mechanism in 2006 and issued its ﬁrst annual CSR report in 2007.215  
CSR activities also play a central role in CNPC’s strategy in Myanmar. As of 
July 2013, the CNPC-led consortium funding the China–Myanmar Pipeline 
Project had already donated more than $20 million to the Myanmar Government 
and local communities for public welfare programmes, including infrastructure, 
health care, education and disaster relief.216 Critics say that because the funding 
was transferred to the Myanmar authorities, it was largely spent in areas far away 
from the pipeline route, and thus did not beneﬁt the people directly affected by 
the project.217  
Most Chinese analysts also criticize Chinese NOCs’ overseas CSR measures as 
inefficient, especially compared to Japanese efforts, which are more moderate but 
receive more attention, both locally and internationally. Chinese NOCs have a 
‘propaganda problem’ because they continue to rely almost exclusively on their 
contacts with national and local governments and fail to develop relationships 
with local populations and the media.218 Other analysts explain the low proﬁle of 
Chinese NOCs as an effort to avoid stoking economic nationalism and accusations 
of neocolonialism.219 While CSR is important, it fails to address underlying causes 
of discontent in communities where Chinese NOCs operate: unemployment and a 
lack of opportunities. In order to address these issues, Chinese NOCs would need 
to make changes in their human resources policies by hiring more unskilled local 
workers and signiﬁcantly increasing training for these workers.  
Political risk insurance  
Insufficient risk-assessment capabilities and a lack of diplomatic support have in 
the past lead to signiﬁcant ﬁnancial losses for Chinese NOCs. For example, prior 
to the overthrow of the Gaddaﬁ regime in 2011, CNOOC had net assets of about 
$300 million in Libya. CNOOC’s estimated losses due to devaluation in the ﬁrst 
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half of 2011 were 65.7 million yuan ($10.1 million).220 Furthermore, CNPC’s poten-
tial maximum losses in Libya were estimated at 1.2 billion yuan ($198 million), as 
attacks on its operations forced it to halt a number of projects.221  
In order to better cope with such losses, Chinese NOCs have increasingly made 
use of political risk insurance. In 2001 China’s ﬁrst and only policy-oriented 
insurance company was established, the China Export and Credit Insurance 
Corporation (Sinosure). A central SOE directly under SASAC, Sinosure has both 
plentiful resources and the political support of the Chinese Government required 
to provide tailor-made services for China’s NOCs. Of these, CNPC is Sinosure’s 
most active client, and it was the ﬁrst NOC to sign a strategic partnership with 
Sinosure to expand cooperation on capital security and political risk assessment 
and management, in 2008.222 As of November 2011 Sinosure had received claims 
from 29 companies for losses in Libya and had paid out a total of approximately 
500 million yuan ($78.6 million), mostly to Chinese construction companies, to 
settle those claims.223 
In addition, Chinese NOCs beneﬁt from the involvement of the two Chinese 
policy banks. In many cases, Chinese investments in the resources sector are 
connected to the contracting of infrastructure projects in the host country to 
Chinese construction companies, ﬁnanced through loans from Chinese policy 
banks.224 This means that the risk of ﬁnancial loss is spread across the institutions 
lending the funds—the policy banks, the Chinese Government as the owner of 
these ﬁnancial institutions, and the Chinese NOCs. Besides beneﬁtting from the 
spread of economic risk, Chinese NOCs are further insulated from political risks 
because the borrower (i.e. the host government) supplies oil to them.225 
Thus, while not driving a rapid major policy change, the globalization of 
Chinese energy interests has led to an incremental adaptation of a number of 
policies at the state and company levels. These changes aim to optimize the 
protection of Chinese energy interests in politically unstable or crisis areas, 
whilst maintaining the credibility of China’s official non-interference policy 
through the outsourcing of risk analysis and crisis-management measures to 
(mostly state-owned) companies. 
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4. Protecting Chinese nationals overseas  
Over the past decade the protection of nationals abroad has emerged as a 
diplomatic priority for China. The high-proﬁle evacuation of over 35 000 Chinese 
citizens from Libya in March 2011 is only one of a number of evacuations from 
crisis zones, while the Chinese MFA is struggling to provide adequate consular 
protection to a rapidly growing number of individuals travelling or residing 
overseas. At the same time, Chinese ﬁrms’ investments in unstable countries and 
regions mean that their employees face safety risks, such as kidnappings and 
terrorist actions. The number of incidents has grown exponentially since the ‘go 
global’ strategy was launched in 1999, and by November 2012 the protection of 
nationals overseas was one of only three new issues designated as diplomatic 
priorities in President Hu’s work report to the 18th Party Congress.226  
Providing protection to increasing numbers of nationals overseas could 
potentially shift Chinese foreign policy away from non-interference but, so far, 
China has addressed the challenge through institutional adaptation. Chinese 
SOEs and government agencies have integrated the issue as a priority and there is 
still room for improvements in crisis prevention and management within the 
non-interference framework. In most crises, China will be able to rely on bilateral 
cooperation with host governments, although the possibility of military action 
can no longer be excluded. China has used military assets in two operations to 
protect nationals abroad, albeit in non-combat roles: the evacuation from Libya 
and the naval escorts in the Gulf of Aden. Importantly, evacuations and consular 
protection enjoy strong public support.  
The Chinese MFA has faced strong online criticism in cases when it has failed 
to take action to protect the safety and the rights of Chinese overseas.227 The 
Chinese Government’s policy is typical of a recent trend in Chinese diplomacy in 
which it must be seen to be responsive to public opinion when the views 
expressed are nationalistic, while at the same time building legitimacy through its 
foreign policy.228 In an era of greater public scrutiny, consular protection is 
important because it provides the Chinese public with a direct understanding of 
‘what China’s great power diplomacy means’.229  
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China’s growing challenge of protecting nationals overseas 
Chinese nationals overseas have been victims of numerous attacks in the 21st 
century. CNPC alone has suffered 41 employee fatalities overseas.230 In 2004 
separate attacks in Kunduz, Afghanistan, and Gwadar, Pakistan, claimed the lives 
of a total of 14 Chinese nationals. The attacks sent shockwaves through the 
Chinese media and provoked an immediate reassessment of the importance of 
protecting nationals abroad.231 The year 2004 was therefore pivotal because it 
was the ﬁrst year in which the Chinese Government realized that its nationals 
abroad could also be targets of terrorist attacks.232 Incidents reported in the 
media are thought to represent only a fraction of the total number of attacks, 
although the true percentage is impossible to determine. This under-reporting 
may also reﬂect attempts to avoid exposure on the part of companies employing 
Chinese workers illegally. 
The Chinese Government does not provide data on the number of its nationals 
abroad, and the Chinese MFA does not publicize consular registration statistics. 
However, most Chinese sources estimate that 5 million Chinese passport holders 
currently reside outside China.233 A 2012 resolution presented at the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) referred to 5.5 million Chi-
nese citizens residing overseas but did not provide a source for this ﬁgure.234 The 
Xinhua news agency has reported similar numbers.235 While Chinese SOEs are 
not the main direct source of employment overseas, they employ approximately 
800 000 Chinese in overseas positions, with CNPC alone counting 14 000 
expatriate employees in early 2013.236 These numbers underestimate the reality 
on the ground, as SOEs employ Chinese workers for short-term contracts, on a 
project basis, through intermediaries. Furthermore, in many countries, Chinese 
nationals facing safety risks are individual businessmen or employees of small- 
and medium-sized enterprises.  
Three official sets of statistics are made available by government agencies. 
Based on customs data, the Chinese MFA estimates that in 1982 a total of 280 000 
Chinese citizens travelled abroad. By 2012 this ﬁgure had passed 83 million and in 
2013 over 98 million Chinese citizens travelled overseas. It has been estimated 
that these numbers will continue to grow at an annual rate of over 10 million per 
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year over the next decade.237 In addition, the Chinese Ministry of Education 
(MOE) estimated that in 2012 there were 400 000 Chinese students overseas.238 
Furthermore, MOFCOM provides data on the number of Chinese who have 
carried out ‘tasks of labour cooperation and engineering contract overseas’ by 
2012 a total of 6.4 million individuals had been employed in such schemes.239 The 
ﬁgures supplied by the Chinese MFA are the most accurate indicator, although it 
does not record the categories of travellers or the lengths of their trips abroad. 
Similarly, the statistics published by MOFCOM and the MOE are incomplete, as 
students and workers do not systematically register themselves with these 
departments before travelling overseas.  
The Chinese MFA often lacks an accurate picture of the number of Chinese 
residents and travellers in speciﬁc countries. The Libyan crisis exposed the gap 
between consular registration numbers and the reality on the ground. Among the 
35 860 nationals evacuated, only 6000 were on the MFA’s records.240 In several 
African countries, including Angola and South Africa, the gap between official 
numbers and official estimates is enormous. In Angola approximately 100 000 
Chinese have registered with MOFCOM for ‘labour cooperation’ but the MFA 
estimates that 200 000–300 000 Chinese citizens reside in the country for pro-
fessional reasons. 241  South Africa, the country with the largest Chinese 
population in Africa, ostensibly hosts 300 000 Chinese residents but the Chinese 
Embassy’s estimate is 600 000.242 Illegal immigration and Chinese nationals 
overstaying their visas constitute major statistical challenges in this respect. 
During the Libyan evacuation, some European states forbade transit of evacuees 
through their territory because a number of Chinese nationals did not possess 
valid passports, and the MFA was obliged to issue 5000 emergency travel docu-
ments.243 The MFA also successfully negotiated visa-free transit via Malta for a 
number of Chinese citizens evacuated from Libya.244 
In recent years, the Chinese MFA and MOFCOM have intensiﬁed efforts to 
obtain a more accurate picture of the number of Chinese nationals overseas. In 
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countries considered risky, consular authorities gather information on Chinese 
communities through exchanges with SOEs, chambers of commerce, overseas 
Chinese associations and local authorities. For example, Chinese officials are 
conﬁdent that approximately 10 000 Chinese nationals reside in Pakistan, the 
country in which the greatest number of Chinese nationals have been attacked 
since 2000.245 However, the information challenge cannot be wholly addressed 
through consular efforts. In general, tourists rarely register with consular 
authorities, which can complicate rescue efforts in cases of natural disaster or 
major incidents, a risk tragically illustrated by the December 2004 tsunami in 
South East Asia, which took the lives of hundreds of European tourists.246 In 
order to respond to similar large-scale natural disasters, the Chinese MFA would 
have to obtain information from travel agencies, airline companies and customs 
authorities in the country in which the disaster took place.  
Recent efforts by the Chinese Government have focused on facilitating access 
to information by creating legal reporting obligations for employers overseas. In 
June 2012 the State Council adopted a MOFCOM text which deﬁnes ‘foreign 
labour service cooperation’ as ‘business activities such as arranging for labour 
service personnel to go to other countries or regions and work for foreign 
enterprises or organizations’.247 Private enterprises involved in foreign labour 
service cooperation are key actors in the expatriation of Chinese nationals. For 
example, in many engineering contracts such enterprises act as intermediaries 
for SOEs that seek to hire labour. The regulations oblige these enterprises to 
inform consular authorities of their activities in foreign countries. In addition, 
the regulations tackle the problem of hidden employment by specifying that 
‘neither unit nor individual shall organize service personnel to work abroad in 
the name of commerce, tourism or study abroad’.248 In 2013 MOFCOM estab-
lished an online database for individuals working overseas in investment and 
cooperation projects, and invited enterprises operating abroad to register their 
employees and provide information about their contracts.249  
Enhancing protection of citizens within the non-interference framework 
China’s main response to the challenge of managing its protection of citizens 
overseas has been to adapt its institutions to emerging risks and crises. In the 
words of one 2004 newspaper editorial: 
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How to respond to terrorist attacks overseas is a problem we had never experienced in the 
past. In reaction, the work of the MFA needs to be partly reorganized. It needs to establish 
a specialized unit to handle security affairs overseas, which would be in charge of coordin-
ating the work of all government agencies involved in protecting citizens abroad.250  
While the Chinese MFA and MOFCOM are at the forefront of protecting 
citizen overseas, other government agencies play a signiﬁcant role. In the past 
three years, the MPS and the PLA have both emerged as important actors, which 
raises questions about the use of military means overseas and its consistency with 
non-interference. Other foreign policy actors include the NDRC and SASAC, 
which play a role in guiding and approving investments overseas (see chapter 3). 
Finally, SOEs and private ﬁrms are on the frontline when it comes to prevention, 
protection and evacuation. Nevertheless, government agencies have not pro-
foundly modiﬁed or transformed the way they work. Rather, they have diverted 
existing resources to prevention and crisis management. In the words of one 
senior Chinese diplomat, ‘the main difference with our work in the past is the 
number of cases we have to handle’.251 
Consular protection 
Since the mid-2000s, consular protection has become a higher priority for the 
Chinese MFA. This reﬂects the attention paid to the issue by Chinese Govern-
ment leaders. The ideological basis of China’s policy on consular protection is Hu 
Jintao’s 2004 guideline to conduct ‘diplomacy serving the people’ (, 
waijiao weimin), a slogan that official sources connect to the protection of 
nationals abroad in the context of the dramatic rise of overseas trips and expatri-
ation.252 Under President Xi Jinping, Foreign Minister Wang Yi has conﬁrmed 
this orientation by arguing that consular protection is the overseas extension of 
the government’s plan to build a domestic welfare system ($&, minsheng 
gongcheng).253 Consular protection does not represent a challenge to the non-
interference principle. Rather, it focuses on direct assistance to individuals and 
close cooperation with local law-enforcement agencies. Questions regarding the 
future consistency of Chinese foreign policy with non-interference only arise 
when consular protection provides inadequate security to Chinese citizens 
abroad.  
Within the Chinese MFA, the Department of Consular Affairs leads consular 
protection work. The keyword to describe recent changes within the MFA to 
improve consular protection is ‘institutionalization’ (
, zhiduhua).254 The 
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ﬁrst important institutional creation occurred in 2004, when the MFA 
established the Department of External Security Affairs to coordinate analysis 
and policy response in terrorist cases involving Chinese citizens overseas.255 In 
2006 it established a consular protection division which in August 2007 was 
elevated in rank and renamed the Centre for Consular Protection, directed by a 
deputy department head. This symbolic upgrade shows the relative importance 
of consular protection work compared to other consular tasks. Even so, the 
number of staff in the department has remained stable over the past decade. The 
Centre for Consular Protection has fewer than 15 permanent staff, while the 
Department of Consular Affairs has around 100 Beijing-based staff and 600 staff 
posted abroad in embassies and consulates.256 Given the number of cases it 
handles—more than 35 000 in 2013 alone, according to the MFA—and the fact 
that its staff numbers have not increased since 2006, it appears that the depart-
ment is understaffed.257 According to Wang, each Chinese consular official pro-
vides services to 180 000 citizens, 30 times more than each US consular official.258  
In November 2011 the Chinese MFA launched its China Consular Services 
Network website in order to centralize security information on travel destin-
ations and provide advice to Chinese citizens intending to travel overseas.259 Also 
in 2011, the MFA published an updated version of its Consular Protection and 
Assistance Guide, which details overseas risks and informs travellers of the 
assistance they can expect from consular authorities.260 At the same time, the 
MFA concluded an agreement with Chinese mobile phone operators under 
which Chinese nationals receive a text message with basic security information 
(e.g. the contact details of the nearest Chinese consulate and local law-
enforcement agencies) on their arrival in a foreign country.261  
A major challenge for the Chinese MFA is communication with other entities 
to prevent and manage crises. In 2004 the MFA established an informal 
coordination mechanism to prearrange communication channels with relevant 
government agencies and the PLA in times of consular crisis.262 Through its 
network of embassies, the MFA also raises awareness among Chinese companies 
so that they improve safety measures and educate their staff on local laws and 
customs.263 The current head of the Department of Consular Affairs, Huang Ping, 
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argues that ‘incidents are caused by two major factors, security conditions that 
are objectively difficult, and more subjectively, the lack of risk awareness of 
Chinese citizens’. As a result, ‘relying on the state is not sufficient—we need the 
joint efforts of our citizens, our ﬁrms and society’.264  
The need to disseminate information and educate travellers is particularly 
important. According to one MFA official, half of the Chinese Government’s 
consular protection actions in 2008 resulted from ‘misbehaviour’ by Chinese 
nationals overseas.265 Cooperation with provincial and local governments is also 
important due to their role as intermediaries between companies and the MFA. 
For example, in cases where Chinese nationals encounter problems when 
working overseas for a Chinese local- or provincial-level SOE, the local 
government to which the SOE responsible contacts the consular authorities in 
Beijing on their behalf. In provinces such as Zhejiang, Guangdong and Fujian that 
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Table 4.1. Chinese non-combatant evacuations, 2006–14 
 
   No. of    
Country Date Event evacuees Method  
Solomon Islands Apr. 2006 Anti-Chinese riots  310 Charter ﬂights 
Timor-Leste Apr. 2006 Violent riots  243 Charter ﬂights 
Lebanon July 2006 War with Israel 167 Road  
Tonga Nov. 2006 Riots in the capital, Nuku’Alofa 193 Charter ﬂights 
Chad Jan. 2008 Civil war 411 Road  
Thailand Nov. 2008 Closure of airport, riots in Bangkok  3 346 Charter ﬂights 
Haiti Jan. 2010 Earthquake 48 Charter ﬂights 
Kyrgyzstan June 2010 Ethnic ﬁghting in the Osh region 1 321 Charter ﬂights 
Egypt Jan. 2011 Arab Spring 1 800 Charter ﬂights 
Libya Mar. 2011 Riots and civil war  35 860 Air, land and sea 
Japan Mar. 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake 9 300 Flights 
CAR Dec. 2012 Civil war >300 Flights 
Syria Sep. 2011/ Civil war 2 000 Road, ﬂights 
 Sep. 2013  
Vietnam  May 2014 Anti-Chinese riots  3 553 Flights, ferries   
CAR = Central African Republic.  
Sources: ‘0&#%)3('"*,’ [Major evacuation operations of
Chinese nationals in recent years], Xinhua, 24 Feb. 2011; Yin, Y., ‘Chinese nationals evacuated from
Central African Republic’, Global Times, 31 Dec. 2012, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/753118.
shtml>; ‘China completes evacuation of citizens from Japan’, Xinhua, Mar. 20, 2011;
‘0 2'$"4’ [Almost 2000 Chinese nationals evacuated from Syria], Wenweibo,
9 Sep. 2013, <http://news.wenweipo.com/2013/09/09/IN1309090063.htm>; and Chinese MFA, ‘MFA
spokesperson Hong Lei, regular press brieﬁng’, 20 May 2014, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1157859.shtml>.  
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have extensive international connections, institutions have been established to 
facilitate protection overseas.266  
Non-combatant evacuation operations  
The most visible sign of China’s evolving approach to protecting Chinese 
nationals abroad is the frequency of non-combatant evacuation operations 
(NEOs) from foreign countries (see table 4.1). Such operations are not new, but 
have dramatically increased in scale during the past decade.  
China conducted its ﬁrst NEO in 1960, when it organized the repatriation by 
sea of nearly 60 000 overseas Chinese (who are not Chinese nationals) from 
Indonesia at a cost of $40 million after anti-Chinese riots.267 Similarly, between 
1965 and 1967 China attempted to repatriate overseas Chinese who were victims 
of anti-communist violence in Indonesia. China’s ambition to evacuate more than 
300 000 individuals by sea at this time encountered capacity problems and 
difficulties in setting up reinsertion programmes for refugees. In the end, only 
4251 people were evacuated.268 In a more recent example, following Iraq’s 1990 
invasion of Kuwait, 5000 Chinese personnel were evacuated from Kuwait with 
Iraqi authorization.269 In recent years, NEOs have become the standard Chinese 
response to crises overseas. To a large degree, NEOs reﬂect adhesion to non-
interference: rather than trying to inﬂuence outcomes in a crisis overseas, China 
prefers withdrawal. However, in the future, NEOs could also become a vector for 
a more interventionist foreign policy if the use of force is needed in order to 
ensure a safe evacuation and avoid casualties among Chinese nationals.  
The Chinese military has never been involved in setting up a security perimeter 
or corridor in a war zone prior to conducting an NEO. Rather, evacuations have 
been conducted in strict adherence with non-interference, minimum military 
involvement and bilateral cooperation with states from which evacuations are 
carried out. At the same time, Chinese NEOs have evolved from purely civilian 
operations spearheaded by the Department of Consular Affairs to complex inter-
agency operations with direct PLA participation. In the past decade China has 
relied on charter ﬂights, with national airlines sending aircraft to crisis zones. 
Between 2006 and 2010 a total of 6000 Chinese citizens were ﬂown back to 
China from countries including Chad, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan (see box 4.1), Lebanon, 
Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Tonga. The year 2011 was a turning 
point, with China evacuating a total of 48 000 citizens from Egypt, Japan and 
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Libya—ﬁve times more than the total number of people evacuated in the period 
1980–2010.  
The 2011 evacuation from Libya  
The 2011 evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya marked the ﬁrst 
involvement of the PLA in an NEO. The Libyan operation was also a landmark 
because of its complexity. It required close inter-agency coordination and intense 
diplomatic cooperation with a number of key countries in Europe, the Middle 
East and North Africa. The PLA was closely involved in decision making and 
inter-agency coordination in Beijing, and executed four distinct missions: 
surveillance, deterrence, escort and actual evacuation (by air). The PLAN dis-
patched the Xuzhou, a Jiangkai-II class frigate that had been patrolling the Gulf 
of Aden, to the Libyan coast to monitor the security environment and deter 
potential threats to the ferries carrying civilians. The frigate escorted at least one 
ferry into the high seas off Libya, en route to Cyprus and Greece.270  
 
270 Li, F., The Chinese Navy’s Maritime Escort Operations (China Intercontinental Press: Beijing, 2013),  
pp. 54–58.  
Box 4.1. The 2010 evacuation from southern Kyrgyzstana  
The evacuation of Chinese citizens from southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, following violent 
clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek groups, was a milestone in the development of Chinese 
non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs). For the ﬁrst time, a Chinese Embassy—in this 
case, the Embassy in Bishkek—coordinated the evacuation of a large number of Chinese nationals 
from a hostile environment with risks of casualties. The Embassy itself recommended the 
evacuation, and received a positive answer from the Chinese Government with details of 
logistical support ﬁve days after submitting its request.b 
The Embassy faced three major difficulties once the operation was authorized: the lack of 
consular presence in Osh, the potential difficulty in securing a military escort from Kyrgyz 
authorities to protect buses on their way to the airport, and the lack of reliable information 
regarding the number of Chinese in the area. Individual traders and small-sized enterprises, 
rather than major state-owned enterprises (SOEs), form the bulk of the Chinese economic 
presence in southern Kyrgyzstan. In the absence of SOEs, the Embassy had to rely on contacts 
with the United Chamber of Commerce of Chinese Nationals in Kyrgyzstan and local overseas 
Chinese associations, such as the Southern China section of the Association of Chinese 
Enterprises. Despite their support, the Embassy acknowledges that it was impossible to locate all 
Chinese citizens (most of them Uyghurs) in the Osh area. The Embassy estimates that, at the time 
of the evacuation, 30 000 Chinese nationals were present in the country, including 7000 in the 
south.c It was able to organize the repatriation to Urumqi of 1321 citizens who beneﬁted from a 
Kyrgyz military escort to Osh airport.  
The crisis demonstrated the importance of consular services in potentially risky areas with 
large numbers of Chinese nationals. As a result, a Chinese consulate was opened in Osh in 2012.d 
 
a For a detailed description of the 2010 evacuation see Bräuner, O., ‘
, 2010
	’ [Protecting Chinese nationals in Kyrgyzstan, the 2010 evacuation operation], Guoji 
Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly], no. 2 (2013), pp. 30–35.  
b Author’s interview with senior Chinese diplomat, Bishkek, Oct. 2012.  
c ‘Two ﬂights take Chinese back home from Kyrgyzstan’, China Daily, 15 June 2010, <http://www. 
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-06/15/content_9977811.htm>.  
d Chinese diplomat, Interviews with authors, Bishkek, Oct. 2012.  
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The PLAAF dispatched four IL-76 transport aircraft to Sabha, in southern 
Libya. The Chinese evacuation task force decided to order military aircraft rather 
than civilian planes because of their capacity to land on short runways in 
potentially complex security environments. The Chinese MND did not issue a 
statement as to whether it had sought prior approval from the Libyan authorities 
to enter Libya’s airspace. However, approval was almost certainly granted, as the 
evacuation had already come to an end on 17 March when the UN Security 
Council ﬁnally voted on the no-ﬂy zone.271 Zhang Dejiang, a Vice-Prime Minister 
and Politburo member who coordinated the operation due to his experience as 
head of the State Council’s Commission for Production Security (which manages 
the security of workers inside China), only declared that the Libyan Government 
and opposition had not opposed China’s sending aircraft.272 The PLA also mobil-
ized a number of Chinese defence attachés posted in Europe, the Middle East and 
North Africa, who were positioned at key geographical points along the Libyan 
border and on ferries in order to ensure coordination on the ground and guaran-
tee an orderly evacuation.273  
The Libya operation highlighted the crucial importance of Chinese ﬁrms in the 
protection of nationals overseas. It also forced these ﬁrms to reﬂect on their 
responsibilities with regards to staff safety. Information on the numbers and 
location of Chinese nationals in the country was scarce, and the Chinese Embassy 
had to send requests to major SOEs (see box 4.2).274 Other SOEs, such as Norinco, 
evacuated their employees before the operation.275 In the same year, in Syria, 
CNPC and Sinopec started to evacuate staff without direct government sup-
port.276  
As discussed in chapter 3, China’s policy towards Libya was criticized 
domestically for its high cost tolerance. Some of the criticism was directed at 
ﬁrms, including foreign labour service cooperation enterprises, and pointed to 
how they took advantage of the Chinese Government’s generosity without 
bearing the costs of the evacuation. As a result, under the 2012 MOFCOM 
regulations, these enterprises are now legally obliged to deposit a ‘risk deposit’ in 
a Chinese bank of no less than 3 million yuan ($482 000), for compensation and 
‘expenses required due to occurrence of emergency, repatriation of service 
personnel or acceptance of ﬁrst aid service’.277 The regulations also make clear 
that, in cases of ‘emergencies such as war, riot and natural disaster’, ‘foreign 
 
271 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (note 54). 
272 Zhao and Zhang (note 243). 
273 Gao, J., ‘$( ,.5$)(%"+-’ [Battle memories of Chinese 
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2011.  
274 Xia, L., ‘	%
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study of the Libya evacuation], Xiya Feizhou, no. 9 (2011), pp. 104–119. For a list of SOEs that have evacuated 
personnel from Libya see Ji, G., ‘ '(0’ [National assets under ﬁre] Jinri Gongcheng Jixie 
[Construction Machinery Today], no. 17 (2011), pp. 72–76.  
275 Senior SOE manager, Interview with authors, Beijing, Nov. 2012.  
276 ‘3*&"+’ [MOFCOM : Sinopec has already evacuated from Syria], 
Xinhua, 30 Aug. 2013; and ‘#1’ [How we handled the crisis in Syria], Zhongguo Shengchan 
Anquan Kexue Jishu [Journal of Safety Science and Technology], vol. 8, Supplement (Dec. 2012), pp. 146–47. 
277 MOFCOM (note 247), Articles 9, 10 (author’s translation).  
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labour service cooperation enterprises and service personnel shall submit’ to the 
arrangements made by the government to manage the crisis.278  
Since the Libyan evacuation, the principle guiding the Chinese approach to 
evacuations is ‘whoever sends personnel overseas is responsible’ (
, shei paichu, shei fuze).279 Although this principle was ﬁrst advanced in 2009, it 
was only after the Libyan evacuation that it materialized into concrete policy 
guidelines. Another important foreign policy adaptation highlighted by the 
Libyan operation is the area of inter-agency coordination. China does not have an 
institutionalized commission to manage crises or organize large-scale evacua-
tions involving different ministries, the PLA and SOEs. The response was to 
create an ad hoc task force, headed by Zhang Dejiang.280 The coordination task 
force was headed at the level of the CCP Politburo to give it the necessary 
 
278 MOFCOM (note 247), Article 18 (author’s translation).  
279 Chinese government official, Interview with authors, Beijing, Oct. 2013; and Xia (note 266), p. 334.  
280 Chinese government official, Interview with authors, Beijing, Feb. 2012.  
Box 4.2. Chinese institutions involved in the Libyan evacuation operation  
Government agencies 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), 
Ministry of Transportation, Civil Aviation Administration of China, All-China Federation of 
Returned Overseas, China Meteorological Administration, China Classiﬁcation Society, China 
Maritime Search and Rescue Centre, National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and 
Geoinformation  
Military units 
People’s Liberation Army Air Force, People’s Liberation Army Navy 
Embassies 
Chinese embassies in Libya, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, Malta and Bulgaria 
Central level state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in evacuations 
Air China, China Eastern Airlines, China Southern Airlines, China Ocean Shipping Group 
Company (COSCO) 
Central level state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with staff evacuated 
China Shipping Group Company, China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSEC), 
China Communication Construction Company (CCCC), China National Building Material 
Company (CNBM), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Railway Construction 
Corporation (CRCC), China National Machinery Industry Corporation (CNMIC), Sinohydro, 
Gezhouba Group, Metallurgical Group of China Corporation (MCC), China Civil Engineering 
Construction Corporation (CCECC) 
Private companies and local-level SOEs involved in evacuations 
Hainan Airlines 
Private companies and local-level SOEs with staff evacuated 
Huawei (private), Changjiang Geotechnical Engineering Corporation (Hubei), Beijing Hongfu 
Group, Huafeng Construction Corporation (Ningbo, private) 
 
Source: ‘
	’ [National operation, the evacuation from Libya] (People’s 
Press of China: Beijing, 2011), pp. 199–201. 
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political clout to give orders to the military, which would have been impossible 
had the MFA’s Consular Department been in charge. Similarly, the evacuation 
from Egypt was reportedly coordinated directly at the level of Dai Bingguo, 
Central Committee member and State Counsillor in charge of foreign affairs.281 
Large-scale evacuations need political involvement at the highest level. The task 
force model proved satisfactory and might be replicated in the future, although 
the establishment of a National Security Commission at the third plenum of the 
18th Central Committee in November 2013 provided China with a new option to 
coordinate foreign and security policy.  
State-owned enterprises and risk prevention 
SOEs and major private corporations such as Huawei are in the frontline when it 
comes to preventing security incidents for their staff. To prevent attacks and 
kidnappings, SOEs have taken a number of measures, including cooperation with 
local law-enforcement agencies, providing better risk awareness through 
education, buying security packages from private ﬁrms, and image improvement 
strategies (essentially CSR programmes). 
On the ground, companies have typically been reactive rather than proactive, 
introducing risk-prevention policies in speciﬁc countries rather than adopting a 
global security strategy. As a result, there are numerous examples of reactive 
measures taken by companies in the areas of education, armed protection and 
CSR. For example, in Pakistan, ZTE Corporation has hired local security guards 
and invited experts to dispense security knowledge to workers, in addition to the 
protection offered by local law-enforcement agencies.282 In Iraq, Chinese energy 
companies have contracted Western private security companies (PSCs). 283 
Chinese employees also beneﬁt from the support of the Iraqi military, with 
armoured vehicles involved in staff rotation. In Kazakhstan, where anti-Chinese 
sentiment is strong, CNPC funds transport and education infrastructure to 
improve its image in the eyes of local stakeholders. CNPC estimates that these 
activities, which it describes as ‘public goods for overseas activities’ (	
, haiwai yewu gongyi) have directly beneﬁted 2 million individuals.284 
Some experts have advocated government regulation to compel SOEs to adopt 
security budgets proportionate to risks, but no legal document on this subject had 
been drafted by mid-2014.285 The question of greater burden sharing between 
government agencies and the SOEs is highly political, because it involves costs. 
Currently, security risks for workers and employees are only loosely integrated in 
the investment-approval procedure, which involves several government agencies 
(see chapter 3).  
 
281 Chinese government official (note 280).  
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283 Western analyst, Interview with authors, Beijing, Jan. 2014.  
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Questioning the sustainability of protection without interference  
The role of the People’s Liberation Army 
The Libyan operation was a milestone in the development of the PLA’s ‘military 
operations other than war’ and its actions in support of foreign policy goals.286 
However, the Chinese military does not perceive the operation as having set a 
standard regarding the modus operandi of future NEOs.287 On the one hand, the 
missions performed by the PLAAF and the PLAN in Libya were routine and did 
not require particular training. On the other hand, there is no evidence of speciﬁc 
training in the PLA to carry out NEOs, although there is clearly an effort to learn 
from the standard operation procedures of the British, French and US armed 
forces.288 
In numerous evacuation operations during the past decade, China has relied on 
the assistance of a supportive government with the capacity to provide military 
support at key logistical points of the evacuation, as exempliﬁed in Kyrgyzstan in 
2010. Similarly, in Libya the security environment was risky but not overtly 
hostile. However, the worst-case scenario of a crisis erupting in a country with 
which China has hostile relations, or in a failed state whose government is unable 
to provide any support to a Chinese evacuation operation, could create the 
conditions for greater Chinese military involvement. The use of special forces to 
extract individuals from dangerous zones and secure an evacuation perimeter, or 
joint operations with Western militaries, cannot be ruled out simply because they 
have not yet occurred. A scenario in which China needs to evacuate tens of 
thousands of its citizens from a country whose forces are openly hostile to it, or 
from a failed state, would clearly call for creative policy solutions. The use of 
special forces to carry out dangerous extraction missions is discussed openly by 
hobbyists on specialized military websites but there is no available open source 
data showing that special forces units are training to perform these kinds of 
mission. When direct involvement and negotiations by Chinese embassies and 
ﬁrms have not succeeded, third parties have helped reach a resolution, as in the 
cases of kidnapped Chinese nationals in Sudan and Colombia who were released 
through the intermediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross.289  
Although Chinese rules of engagement in the Gulf of Aden have never been 
made public, they are clearly restrictive. Unlike the navies of to Western 
countries or India, the PLAN task force has never inﬂicted casualties on pirates 
when retaking hijacked vessels or protecting a commercial ship under attack. The 
task force strictly restricts itself to escort missions and avoids combat situations. 
According to the Chinese MND, in most protection operations in the Gulf of 
 
286 See Gill, B. and Huang, C., China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implications, 
SIPRI Policy Paper no. 25 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Nov. 2009). 
287 Chinese military officer, Interviews with authors, in Beijing, 2012.  
288 Western defence attachés, Interviews with authors, Beijing, 2012 and 2013.  
289 ‘Kidnapped Chinese workers freed in Sudan oil state’, Reuters, 7 Feb. 2012; and ‘4 Chinese kidnap 
victims freed in Colombia’, Fox News Latino, 22 Nov. 2012, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/ 
11/22/4-chinese-kidnap-victims-freed-in-colombia>.  
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Aden, PLAN ships were able to scare away pirate ships by using helicopters to 
ﬁre warning shots.290 Furthermore, Chinese escorts of World Food Programme 
shipments stop before entering the territorial waters of Somalia in order to avoid 
exchanges of ﬁre with pirates and adhere strictly to non-interference. Once in 
Somali waters, European naval ships take over the escort.291  
The role of the Ministry of Public Security 
The MPS is also a newcomer to the protection of Chinese citizens overseas, 
reﬂecting the growing power of domestic security services during the 17th 
Central Committee of the CPC (2007–12), under the leadership of Zhou 
Yongkang, a Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) member and the head of the 
CPC’s Central Political and Legislative Committee. There is evidence that Zhou 
took a personal interest in the issue. For example, in 2004, after the attacks on 
Chinese citizens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, he initiated the ﬁrst ‘work 
conference on the protection of nationals and entities overseas’, which raised the 
question of intergovernmental coordination to manage crises.292 The protection 
of nationals was integrated in MPS diplomacy in Afghanistan, South East Asia 
and a number of African countries. It is likely that the MPS focused on obtaining 
guarantees from counterparts in these countries that they would prioritize the 
safety of Chinese nationals. Whether the role of the MPS will continue growing 
now that it is no longer directly represented in the PBSC remains an open 
question.  
In 2011, after the killing of 13 Chinese sailors on the Mekong River in Thailand, 
the MPS took the lead in negotiating and drafting a joint statement signed by 
China, Myanmar, Thailand and Laos on cooperation in patrols and law enforce-
ment along the Mekong.293 Although the MFA was involved in the negotiations, 
the agreement can be considered a major foreign policy achievement for the 
MPS, which subsequently negotiated the extradition from Laos of Naw Kham, a 
drug lord and principal suspect in the murder of the Chinese sailors. Some of 
Naw Kham’s associates were arrested in Myanmar and also extradited. They were 
tried in Yunnan, China, and Naw Kham was sentenced to death in November 
2012.294 The idea of a drone strike on Myanmar was also mentioned in the press 
by a senior MPS official.  
The MPS is also the leading Chinese agency with respect to joint patrols with 
Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. By September 2013 a total of 14 joint patrols had 
been conducted, including escort, inspections and interception.295 The ministry 
engages patrol boats from the China Border Police Force including heavily armed 
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special troops.296 The fact that these units are integrated into joint patrols under 
an international agreement rather than conducting unilateral patrols shows that 
the MPS exercises extreme caution when engaging overseas, and exempliﬁes its 
tactical ﬂexibility in the context of the non-interference principle.  
The role of the MPS in protecting Chinese nationals overseas has also grown 
through the dispatch of police liaison officers to foreign countries. The system 
was originally designed to increase cooperation with foreign countries on the 
issue of trafficking, especially of narcotics. By the end of 2012, the MPS had 
stationed 38 police liaison officers in 23 countries.297 Their responsibilities have 
gradually expanded to cover other non-traditional threats such as terrorism, but 
also close bilateral cooperation with local law-enforcement agencies to investi-
gate crimes against Chinese nationals, including those perpetuated by Chinese 
criminal gangs. For example, Angola extradited 37 Chinese nationals after an 
investigation conducted with the local MPS branch, for crimes committed against 
other Chinese people.298 
The role of private security companies 
Actions by private security companies contracted by government agencies or 
public companies can have foreign policy implications. A scenario in which a 
Chinese PSC opened ﬁre in order to protect employees or a facility overseas 
would change the perception of Chinese foreign policy. Given the domination of 
the public sector in many Chinese investments abroad, the use of force could be 
interpreted as Chinese interference in a state’s domestic affairs. The Deputy 
Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPPCC, Han Fangming, has 
urged the development of a Chinese version of the US PSC Blackwater and 
advocates international expansion for Chinese security ﬁrms, in order to ‘pro-
vided armed protection for Chinese ﬁrms operating in dangerous regions’.299 
However, this position was criticized by the MFA.300  Furthermore, such a 
scenario is unrealistic in the present circumstances. While the Chinese private 
security industry is growing at an annual rate of 20 per cent per year, most 
Chinese PSCs operate on Chinese soil.301  
Private security companies with activities overseas are only now beginning to 
emerge. For example, Shandong Huawei Security Group established an ‘overseas 
security centre’ in Beijing in 2010 and hires former special forces troops.302 The 
company is a former SOE under the Qufu branch of the MPS that was privatized 
in 2009, and which has identiﬁed the internationalization of Chinese ﬁrms as a 
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major potential market. The security packages it offers to companies operating 
overseas include risk-assessment expertise, support for communication with 
local authorities in the country of investment and the Chinese Government, 
education and training of employees, improvement of internal organization, and 
surveillance equipment for industrial facilities. However, these packages do not 
include armed guards.303 While Shandong Huawei occasionally dispatches body-
guards to protect senior executives of Chinese companies during their trips 
overseas, this is not a priority in its international development strategy. When the 
contract requires armed personnel, Shandong Huawei subcontracts their recruit-
ment to a foreign ﬁrm.304  
Another pioneer in this area is the Beijing-registered Huaxin Zhong’an, which 
sent its ﬁrst batch of armed personnel on Chinese commercial ships in the Gulf of 
Aden in March 2012, including retired PLA Navy personnel who participated in 
the anti-piracy ﬂotillas. However, it faces ﬁerce competition from Western PSCs 
in this market.305 Genghis Security Academy, founded in 2012, is one of the few 
Chinese PSCs with a stated ambition to develop internationally. It offers 
bodyguards for the Chinese domestic market and self-defence combat training. 
While Genghis has dispatched bodyguards abroad to accompany Chinese 
individuals on overseas trips, this remained a minor activity in 2013.306  
Western companies dominate the private security market for operations over-
seas. Companies operating in China and offering services to SOEs or private 
Chinese multinationals (and not only to Western customers operating in China) 
include world leaders such as Control Risks and G4S, and a number of other 
ﬁrms. Most Western PSCs are seeking to expand their activities with new 
Chinese customers.307 For example, Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, has 
established Frontiers Resource Group, a new company registered in Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab Emirates, with the speciﬁc aim of offering security packages to 
Chinese enterprises investing in Africa. 308  The mother company, Frontier 
Services Group, is publicly listed on the Hong Kong stock market. In an interview, 
Prince stated that the use of weapons by Frontiers Services Group would be ‘the 
exception, not the rule’.309 
Two main factors explain Chinese security companies’ caution when con-
sidering international expansion. First, most Chinese security ﬁrms are run by 
active duty MPS officials. In essence, the security business in China is public. 
These companies focus on the domestic market and refrain from offering services 
overseas because, as public entities, their activities abroad would engage the 
foreign policy of China. Second, Chinese law on the control of ﬁrearms (
, zhonghua renmin gongheguo qiangzhi guanli fa) is extremely 
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restrictive, and does not allow individuals or private entities to purchase or carry 
ﬁrearms.310 This legal restriction prevents private ﬁrms from conducting gun 
training in China before sending staff overseas, and represents a major obstacle to 
the overseas expansion of the private Chinese security sector.  
Looking ahead, it appears inevitable that Chinese private security companies 
will increasingly contemplate overseas markets. Although the political con-
straints on their international expansion remain strong, these companies will be 
able to acquire foreign assets or strike partnerships with Western ﬁrms. However, 
it is likely that extreme caution and restraint will prevail regarding private 
security company personnel’s ability to carry weapons and rules of engagement in 
order not to jeopardize China’s international image. 
 
310 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Control of Firearms, promulgated 5 July 1996, <http://www. 
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5. Conclusions  
The continued globalization of China’s interests has been highly challenging for 
China’s non-interference principle. The expansion of Chinese energy interests 
overseas and the need to protect a growing number of Chinese nationals in 
international conﬂict zones have repeatedly underlined the limits of China’s 
traditional approach and generated new thinking regarding non-interference. As 
long as China continues to deepen its engagement with the global economy, 
tensions are bound to grow between a traditional interpretation of non-
interference, China’s increasing economic role and the diplomatic leverage of 
that role in other countries. Chinese policymakers have chosen a cautious 
approach of pragmatic adaptation to respond to these challenges. This means that 
a more dramatic shift towards an interventionist policy is highly unlikely, at least 
in the short-to-medium term. 
The ongoing domestic debate on non-interference in China indicates that the 
understanding of non-interference in China’s foreign policy community is not 
static but in ﬂux, and this reﬂects the diverse and sometimes conﬂicting self-
identities that underlie China’s world views and mindsets. Since non-interference 
remains crucial for Chinese ‘core interests’—and especially for regime survival 
and territorial integrity—China will not easily relax its vigilance and drop this 
principle in the foreseeable future. In addition, China’s analysis of the tumultous 
events of the Arab Spring underlined the practical value of non-interference and 
the need to adhere to it. However, normative developments in the international 
system, particularly the greater emphasis on human security, as well as the urgent 
need to protect China’s rapidly expanding overseas interests, have contributed to 
the domestic recalibration of the relevance and validity of this longstanding 
principle and a growing expectation that the Chinese military should play a more 
active role. China has engaged in a policy of pragmatic adaptation and shown 
growing ﬂexibilities in its practice of non-interference. The emergence of new 
concepts facilitates this gradual change and equips China with more leeway to 
pursue an increasingly engaged foreign policy posture.  
China’s growing demand for natural resources has meant that Chinese NOCs 
are increasingly active in conﬂict zones around the world, linking domestic 
energy security to global security issues. China’s non-interference policy, com-
bined with a lack of experience and overseas power-projection capabilities, has 
imposed serious limits on Chinese attempts to protect its overseas energy 
interests. The Chinese Government remains reluctant to intervene diplomatically 
or militarily in support of its NOCs, which has resulted in substantial losses, for 
example in Libya, South Sudan and Sudan. In order to overcome this handicap, 
China has increasingly engaged in a diversiﬁcation of its diplomatic outreach 
beyond contacts with ‘legitimate governments’ and local elites, and has attempted 
mediation between conﬂict parties. China has also strengthened the risk 
assessment, crisis response and political insurance capacities of its NOCs. More 
radical approaches, especially the use of the PLA to protect energy assets abroad, 
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seem unfeasible—at least in the short-to-medium term. In both the Libyan and 
the Sudanese cases, serious challenges to Chinese energy (and other economic) 
interests did not prove strong enough to force a radical change in China’s foreign 
policy. As a result, China still lacks a coherent diplomatic strategy and insti-
tutional framework to actively protect its energy interests abroad. 
Since the introduction in 2004 of the ‘diplomacy serving the people’ guideline, 
the protection of nationals abroad has clearly become a diplomatic priority for 
Beijing. The boom in overseas travel and work by Chinese people means that 
Chinese citizens are more susceptible to risks and attacks abroad. So far, insti-
tutional adaption and capacity building within the non-interference framework 
have been China’s main responses. The MFA has sought to reinforce preventive 
measures, institutionalize its internal consular protection system and establish 
inter-agency coordination mechanism to provide better service for Chinese 
overseas citizens. Additionally, in major emergencies, China has gradually 
accumulated experience in conducting NEOs. Even in its largest and most 
complex evacuation operation, in Libya in 2011, China acted in accordance with 
non-interference with minimum military involvement and approval from rele-
vant states. However, the sustainability of this approach is likely to be called into 
question by the growing involvement of armed actors, including the PLA, the 
MPS and private security companies in the protection of nationals abroad.  
The Chinese policy response to the increasing need to protect its overseas 
interests is characterized by three major developments. First, gradual insti-
tutionalization constitutes the preferred response to a rapidly evolving external 
environment. In the ﬁeld of energy security, the NOCs are leading this process by 
improving their risk-assessment and crisis-response capabilities. In terms of 
protecting Chinese citizens overseas, the MFA has expanded its consular pro-
tection services and institutionalized coordination and cooperation with other 
branches of the government, SOEs and the PLA. The MPS played a growing role 
under Hu Jintao but it remains to be seen whether this growth will continue 
under Xi Jinping, although the Mekong river patrols are likely to be permanent. 
Second, the evolution of Chinese policy is driven by interests rather than by ideas, 
ideologies or institutional considerations. Third, the protection of nationals 
abroad is much more likely to lead Chinese foreign policy towards greater inter-
ventionism than the protection of energy interests abroad, mainly because of the 
enormous public and government attention to the former in recent years. In fact, 
attacks against Chinese energy assets abroad remain rare. Ensuring energy 
security is also often seen through a geopolitical lens and lacks a human security 
angle, unless it involves threats to individual workers. Coupled with the con-
tinued culture of corporate secrecy on the part of China’s NOCs, these factors 
lead to relative public disinterest in the protection of energy interests abroad.  
Unexpected events—including murders in South East Asia and civil war in 
Libya—have forced China to innovate and explore policy options that stretch the 
previously known limits of its foreign policy under the non-interference prin-
ciple. As a result, it can be argued that unexpected events in the future will also 
generate new changes and further weaken non-interference. A dramatic policy 
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change, such as the use of special forces in overseas extraction operations, arrests 
or even targeted assassinations (as was considered in the case of Naw Kham), 
cannot be entirely discounted. In addition, in case of a major NEO further away 
from Chinese coasts than Syria—for example, on the west coast of Africa—China 
would have to rely on PLA assets. However, for the time being, such a dramatic 
shift towards an interventionist policy that includes the unilateral deployment of 
Chinese troops in hostile overseas environments remains highly unlikely. 
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